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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it 
Found Appellant Had Earned $3,800 Per Month. 
Standard of Review: "An appellate Court will not reverse the findings of 
fact of a trial Court sitting without a jury unless they are. . . clearly erroneous." 
(quoting MacKav v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995). Moreover, in those 
instances in which the trial Court's findings include inferences drawn from the 
evidence, the findings will be upheld unless the logic upon which their 
extrapolation from the evidence was based "is so flawed as to render the inference 
clearly erroneous:' State v. Briggs, (2008) UT 75,1fl 1, 197 P.3d 628,631, quoting 
Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, (2007) UT 56, 118, 184 P.3d 791. 
II. Issue: The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it 
Chose Not To Deduct $27,207.59 from Appellant's Earnings. 
Standard of Review: Same as Issue I above. 
III. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When 
it Awarded the Appellant Her Unpaid Wages as Part of 
the Division of Marital Assets. 
Standard of Review: Same as Issues I and II above. A valuation or 
distribution issue is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, (2008) UT App 11, flM, 176 P.3d 476 ("We defer 
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to the trial Court in its findings of fact related to property valuation and 
distribution). See Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209,1211 (Utah App. 1991) 
"Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard 
of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial Court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (internal quotation marks omitted). 
IV. Issue : The Decree of Divorce Entered in this Case is Not A 
"Punitive" Decree and is Not Contrary to Utah Law. 
The plain error exception enables the appellate court to "balance the need 
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 
116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989). At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us 
to avoid injustice. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 n.8. (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This divorce case was tried before the bench on August 4th and 5th, 2008, 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg residing. The Court, upon the conclusion of the case, 
took the matter under advisement. The Court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order on October 15, 2008.l There were numerous post 
trial pleadings filed and on April 15, 2009 the matter resulted in entry of a Decree 
of Divorce based on the findings. Appellant then filed her Notice of Appeal. R. at 
appellant's opening Brief failed to attach as an Addendum the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed October 15, 2008, and the Decree of 
Divorce, filed April 15, 2009. Appellee hereby attaches both pleadings as an 
Addendum hereto. R. at 1704-1721; (Findings); 1907-1927 (Decree). 
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1704-1721, 1907-1927, 1968-1969. 
Appellant, the wife in this divorce case, in an effort to get what she wanted, 
decided at the beginning of the case (3 + years prior to trial) that she was going to 
hide hundreds of thousands of dollars of compensation owed her for her services 
over many years to a family Trust she had worked for, and eventually taken 
control over. This Trust is worth millions of dollars. Comfortable in her position 
of control, she determined she could avoid sharing her compensation with her 
husband and at the same time reap the benefit of his hard earned monies. 
Appellant, over the course of this case and up to trial, repeatedly denied any 
right to income from the Trust for her full-time labor for many years. She 
repeatedly signed things and verbally represented under oath that any monies she 
had taken over the years were "gifts", not compensation. 
Appellee knew this position was untrue in his heart, but struggled with 
proof in that Appellant controlled the Trust, including its records. Appellee had 
worked for his adult life and saved money, operating a crane, with the hope that 
upon retirement the parties would live comfortably with the money from the Trust 
they were owed. 
On the eve of trial Appellant become fearful that her scheme would be 
discovered through testimony of her siblings and others, and in a surprise move, 
finally admitted that Appellee was right and that she was entitled to a substantial 
amount of compensation for her services to the Trust. 
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The following trial was interesting as substantial evidence, witness needs, 
documents, and strategy had been turned upside down with the dilatory admission 
of the key fact in the case. 
The Court then was tasked with having to calculate Appellant's 
compensation given Appellant's complete lack of credibility and new strategy 
aimed at minimizing her compensation claim. 
As all trial judges are forced to do, the Court believed some evidence over 
other evidence based on credibility and reliability. Appellant appeals the Court's 
findings of fact in relation to the compensation and it is clear to Appellee that this 
Appeal is without merit. There is reliable evidence to support the three findings 
this Appeal challenges, and merely because the Court did not believe some of the 
evidence "created" and not corroborated by Appellant, she is upset. The standard 
of review is "clearly erroneous". This Appeal does not meet that standard. Fees 
and costs should be awarded Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Appellant's "Statement of Facts" she does not set forth all the relevant 
facts applicable to the appealed issues that were presented to the trial Court. In 
fact, a careful review of the Appellant's alleged facts indicate that most are not 
relevant to the issues raised on Appeal (see, #s 1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 and 
21). Appellant's remaining "facts" are not in all respects a true rendition of the 
record. For example, Appellant's facts #17 and #19 relating to admission of 
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exhibits #22 and #50 fail to clarify that although the exhibits were admitted into 
evidence, they were NOT agreed to as to truthful and did not therefore 
automatically become uncontested facts. Quite to the contrary, the credible 
testimony and the ultimate findings of the Court were that the exhibits were not 
truthful or reliable, and that credible evidence contradicted said exhibits. The 
mere fact that Appellee allowed the exhibits to be admitted into evidence did not 
make them true. It should be noted that each of those two exhibits were generated 
by the Appellant, or her counsel for the Trust, and contradict her sworn testimony 
in the case. Lastly, Appellant's fact #26 is untrue. The Court did not conclude 
that the monies "allegedly" paid by the Trust to the Appellant for services and 
consumed by the parties was a reliable fact. Appellee did not contest the 
admission of exhibit #22 (wherein the monies are addressed) but thereafter 
presented evidence to the court's satisfaction that it was unreliable and the Court 
so found. 
The Appellant also omits key facts that are essential to understanding the 
trial Court's findings in this case. Some of the facts not clearly stated or omitted 
completely by Appellant are as follows: 
1. Petitioner knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court filings and in 
this litigation consistently over three years. Through cross-examination at trial, 
Petitioner's testimony was repeatedly shown to have been untruthful and evasive. 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at^flO). 
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2. The Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that she 
repeatedly lied in her deposition under oath when she represented that she was 
NOT entitled to any money from the trust. (T 2027 at 139, lines 16-19). 
3. The Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that during 
the three years of discovery and related requests thereto, for every discovery 
request ever done in the case, formally or informally, Appellant lied when she 
consistently represented that she was not entitled to any wages for her work for the 
Trust. (T 2027 at 139, lines 20-25). 
4. Up to approximately one week before the beginning of trial in this 
matter, Appellant stood behind her repeated lies. (T 2027 at 140, lines 1-4). 
5. Appellant's pattern of lying also included, in addition to the failure 
to disclose hundreds of thousands of dollars due her for her work for the family 
Trust, lies about her other assets. (T 2027 at 141-142, lines 18-4). 
6. Appellant even went so far as to state under oath in her deposition 
that she was NOT employed at all for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006 and to the current date of the deposition. (T 2027 at 142-143, lines 5-
25, and 1-15). 
7. Appellant admited under cross examination at trial that she was 
employed during all of the years mentioned above by the Trust and that the Trust 
owed her for her services. (T 2027 at 143, lines 12-15). 
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8. Not only did Appellant lie about working, and being owed monies 
for her services, she stated that all monies she had received from the Trust during 
the relevant years for work she had done were considered by her to be "gifts". (T 
2027 at 144, lines 1-8). 
9. Appellant even went so far as to say she had not received 
compensation for working for the Trust back to 1998. (T 2027 at 144-145, lines 
24-10). 
10. Appellant represented under oath in her deposition that she did NOT 
keep track of her time that she worked for the Trust. At trial she submitted an 
exhibit (Exhibit #22) that was unsigned, undated, mostly handwritten 
representation of her alleged hours worked for days and years for the Trust, and 
testified that in fact these were records of time spent working for the Trust. (T 
2027 at 148-149, lines 20-25 and 1-21, and Exhibit #22). 
11. The hours Appellant finally submitted on the eve of trial to indicate 
all work done for the Trust and the compensation owed indicated among other 
suspicious things that she had worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for 5 straight 
weeks. Her hourly pay for that month alone would be $8,424.00. (Exhibit #22) 
12. The Appellant admits to misleading counsel for Appellee during the 
pendency of the case by not telling the truth "Q: Were you not frank with me in 
your deposition?" A: "I was not frank with you." Q: Many times, correct?" A: 
"Correct". (T 2027 at 149, lines 18-21. 
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13. Appellant claims she lied to Ford Motor Credit to get a loan. (T 
2027 at 164, lines 5-6). 
14. In cross-examination at trial Appellant finally admitted that she lied 
repeatedly in this case to get what she wants. (T. at 164, lines 7-13, Q: "have you 
lied repeated times in this case, Ms. Richins, - repeated times, numerous times, to 
get what you want? A: "Yes"). 
15. The Court found that Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility 
and should be given weight only to the extent there was corroborative evidence to 
support it. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at f^lO) 
16. Appellant testified that she is a co-trustee for the Helen Powell 
Family Trust. (T 2027 at 94, lines 18-20). 
17. Appellant testified when asked how many years she had been a 
trustee that she didn't know for sure, stating "I don ' t . . . six year, seven, I don't 
know". (T 2027 at 151, lines 7-9). 
18. Appellant testified that she didn't know what agreement was made 
as far as payment to her from the trust. "I don't really know it . . ." (T. at 2027 
127 line 25). 
19. Appellant testified that she has authority to write checks from the 
Trust bank accounts. (T 2027 at 153, lines 4-9). 
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20. Appellant testified that as co-trustee she did not keep a 
contemporaneous record of the time she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148, 
lines 20-25, T. at 149, lines 1-3). 
21. Appellant testified that she had to re-create records in order to 
submit a claim to the Trust as reflected in her personally manufactured Appellant's 
Exhibit #22. (T 2028 at 237, lines 8-10). 
22. Appellant testified that she did submit the application to Ford Motor 
Credit and that she authorized and stood behind the information provided on that 
application. (See Respondent's exhibit #28, T 2027 at 166, lines 24-25, T 2027 at 
167, lines 1, 2. Exhibit 28). 
23. Appellant applied for the loan from Ford Motor Company 
individually, not in the name of the Trust, and the application (Exhibit 28) does 
not indicate Appellant applied in the name of the Trust or as trustee of the Trust. 
(T 2027 at 220 at lines 10-14). 
24. Appellant testified that she recognized and was familiar with the 
balance sheet of the Trust prepared in September 2000, which indicated the Trust 
was worth over $3.2 million. (T 2027 at 179, lines 10-18). 
25. Appellant claims the [Powell Family Trust] did not have the liquid 
ability to pay her while at the same time she admits that the Trust was giving her 
and each of her 4 siblings "gift" payments of $500 per month, from May 2001 
until January 2005. (T 2027 at 121, lines 20- 25, T 2027 at 122, line 1-17). 
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26. Appellant submitted two separate sworn Financial Declarations to 
the Court, neither of which described or listed her claim to wages owed from the 
Trust, among other glaring omissions and misstatements under oath. (See Pet. ex. 
59, Resp. ex. 33). 
27. The Court found that although Petitioner had control of the Trust and 
could have paid herself for her services at the time they accrued, Appellant 
intentionally chose not to withdraw those funds but to shelter them in the Trust as 
unrecognized income. (See Findings of Fact f 15). 
28. Exhibit #22 was prepared by Appellant to show alleged payments of 
$27,207.50 to her and Appellee for work for the trust. (See Exhibit 22, T 2027 at 
124 lines 15-17, T 2027 at 125-126, lines 19-2). 
29. Appellee testified contrary to Exhibit #22 that he in fact disputed the 
accounting of Appellant for hours worked for the trust, and stated contrary to 
Exhibit #22 that he in fact did NOT get paid according to the representations in 
said exhibit. (T 2028 at 387 lines 2-25 to T 2028 at 388, lines 1-5). 
30. The Court found that although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee 
of the Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggested 
that Petitioner had exercised full control over the Trust's assets and had used the 
Trust structure in whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal 
interest. (See Findings of Fact Tf 18). 
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31. Appellant repeatedly requested (and the Court complied) that the 
Court award her the party's marital residence, a non liquid asset, which has a value 
of $181,000.00 (T 2027 at 19 lines 14-19, and T 2028 at 430 line 16). 
32. The Decree of Divorce equally divides the marital estate by 
awarding each party the equivalent of 50 percent of every dollar of value 
determined by the Court to be a part of the estate. In fact, the Decree awarded 
Appellee as part of his 50% almost three times the amount of IRA funds (not 
liquid by definition of Appellant). {See Decree of Divorce). 
33. Both parties were awarded various types of assets, including 
substantial cash, personal and real property, pension or retirement related 
accounts. In fact, by the time of trial the marital estate had a net value of over 
$760,000, after already paying out equally to the parties approximately $400,000 
earlier in the litigation. The net value was therefore approximately 1.16 million 
dollars. {See Decree of Divorce). 
34. Nowhere in the Decree of Divorce, nor the Findings of the Court, 
does the Court mention or even infer that it is giving Appellee an advantage in the 
distribution of assets, in amount or type, or to punish, or to in anyway react 
punitively against the Appellant for her actions in the case. {See Decree of Divorce 
and Findings of Fact). 
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ARGUMENT 
This Appeal is simply an attack on the findings (three of them) of the trial 
Court. After a review of the trial transcript it is clear that the Judge had ample 
evidence to support her rulings. This is a case where the Appellant simply 
disagrees with the result, not one where the lower Court made any errors. The 
Appellate Court is not to revise any findings of fact of the trial Court unless they 
find them to be clearly erroneous (MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 
1995). 
The broad discretion accorded the trial Court in making findings, 
particularly in the context of a divorce proceeding, simply acknowledges that the 
trial Court is seeking to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and 
that the trial Court is best suited to weigh the evidence because "the trial judge has 
observed 'facts' such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998) (quoting State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 Utah 1984). 
The present case was a bench trial. "In a bench trial or other proceeding in 
which the judge serves as fact finder, the Court has considerable discretion to 
assign relative weight to the evidence before it. This discretion includes the right 
to minimize or even disregard certain evidence." Thus, we defer to the trial 
Court's assessment on this matter. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 
12 
72, {^75, 99 P.3d 801. In this case, as the Appeals Court will quickly see, the lower 
Court did in fact disregard certain evidence, and rightfully so. 
Although there were other witnesses that testified in the trial, the only 
witnesses that testified on the issues of this appeal were the parties. There were 
also very few documents presented on the issues being appealed, thus making this 
review really quite narrow. In fact, Appellant's Appeal rides solely on Exhibit 
#22. That Exhibit will be herein examined, as the trial Court did, and found to be 
severely lacking in credibility. The record at trial, based on the testimony of the 
parties and the documents presented clearly shows that the lower Court had 
sufficient evidence to support its findings and conclusions on each any every issue 
that form the basis of this Appeal. 
There are four (4) issues the Appellant is asking this Court to review. 
Following is Appellee's position on each: 
I. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it 
Found Appellant Had Earned $3,800 Per Month. 
As stated in the Statement of Facts above, the Appellant contended for over 
three years during the pendency of this litigation that she was not to be 
compensated for working for her family Trust, and that said Trust owed her 
nothing for her services. Appellee tried through letters, written discovery, 
depositions, and third party witnesses, to prove that in fact the full time and efforts 
that Appellant spent "working" for the Trust of her parents for many years was for 
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compensation and that she was lying. The trial Court recognized this when it said 
in its Findings, "It is undisputed that the Trust documents authorized payment for 
compensation of trustees who work for the Trust. Neverthelesss, through much of 
the pendency of this case Petitioner (Appellant) adamantly denied, under oath, 
that she had a compensation arrangement with the Trust. Instead, she asserted 
that her services to the Trust were in a volunteer capacity to help her parents. 
Petitioner's belated acknowledgment that she is owed compensation by the Trust 
did not occur untilJuly 30, 2008-practically on the eve of trial. " Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order at page 4, footnote 6. 
On the "eve of trial", Appellant for the first time, and totally contrary to 
copious under oath representations to the contrary, finally relented and admitted 
that she was in fact entitled to substantial compensation for several years from the 
Trust. This admission sparked a serious debate about how to properly calculate 
that compensation given the credibility issues presented by the historical denials of 
the Appellant on the issue. Literally tens of thousands of dollars and months 
turning into years could have been avoided had this truth been revealed earlier, 
instead of secreted away until the pressure of trial and potential discovery brought 
Appellant to at least a portion of truth. Indeed, the Court stated in her Findings 
i(Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility and should be given weight only 
to the extent there was corroborative evidence to support it " (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order at 110). 
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On the eve of trial and at trial, Appellant presented a self serving, undated, 
unsigned, handwritten exhibit purported to be a calculation of what the Trust 
owed her (See Exhibit 22). She concluded based on their Exhibit that the Trust 
owed her some $118,000 for her many years of service. Appellee disagreed with 
the calculations and amounts but was relieved with the admission that at least 
some amount was due. Although not objecting to the admission of Exhibit #22, 
Appellee made it clear that he did not agree to its content or reliability (see 
additional statements of fact below on the credibility problems with Exhibit #22). 
In contrast, Appellee put into evidence Exhibit #28, a Ford Motor Credit 
Application, wherein the Appellant applied for a loan during the relevant time 
period. This document was a loan application form prepared by a third party, 
filled out admittedly at the direction of Appellant herself, signed as 
acknowledged by Appellant, and used to secure money from a lending 
institution. The Court in its discretion found the loan application to be an 
admission against interest, more credible, and used the same to help fashion a 
finding on the compensation owed the Appellant from the Trust. (See Findings, 
Tf's 13 and 14). This finding is being appealed as clearly erroneous. 
For the Appellant to claim that the Court somehow based its finding on 
"inference" or "speculation" is clearly unsupported by the record. The loan 
application is clearly evidence that the Court could and in fact did rely on. A 
simple reading of the Court's Findings, paragraphs 13 and 14, puts an abrupt end 
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to this issue on appeal. At one point the Court stated on the issue "Whether or 
not those representations to Ford Credit were truthful the Court finds that it is 
fair and appropriate to hold Petitioner (Appellant) to the certification she made 
in that credit application as an admission against interest. Therefore, the Court 
finds that during the term of the marriage Petitioner was employed by the Trust 
for no less than 82.3 months at a gross montly wage of $3,800per month, for 
total gross imputed earnings during the period of $312,740. " Findings at f^ 14. 
It seems that Appellant in her brief is arguing that because she lied so many 
times, that the Court committed clear error in using one of her "alleged" lies to 
determine her compensation. It seems illogical for the Appellant to argue that the 
Court should have believed one purported false document submitted by Appellant 
over another. Appellant argues that a letter, put into evidence without testimony 
of its author (who did not testify nor present himself for cross examination, (See 
Exhibit #50), together with the document put together by Appellant herself (See 
Exhibit #22), and another loan application3 that was not put into evidence or 
testified to by anyone at trial are uncontroverted. This is simply wishful thinking. 
Note that appellant now claims she lied in the Ford loan application as 
well. (T 2027 at 149, lines 18-21) 
3
 Appellant argues there is another credit application in the year 2003. This 
application is not an exhibit in this case. It is unclear how Appellant now tries to 
rely on a document she herself failed to put in evidence or argue at trial. The 
Appellant was unable in her brief herein to corroborate her position that the 2003 
loan application is relevant given the fact that she chose NOT to introduce the 
16 
It is not this Court's obligation to undertake an independent assessment of 
the evidence presented during the course of trial and reach separate findings with 
respect to that evidence. Rather, it is to endeavor only to evaluate whether the 
Court's findings are so lacking in support that they are against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
The trial court was tasked to weigh the evidence presented on each and every 
issue of this case. The Court presided over this two day trial, took copious notes, 
participated in the examination of witnesses as she saw fit, and spent over two 
months before making her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. She 
then entertained extensive post trial motions and had ample opportunity to 
reconsider all of her Findings and Conclusions and Order before signing the 
Decree of Divorce. 
This Appeals Court has been asked to review the results of the bench trial for 
sufficiency of evidence in this case and to determine if the lower Court did 
something that was "clearly erroneous". "When reviewing a bench trial for 
2003 application into evidence, and she also more importantly chose NOT to 
testify about the application, nor bring it up anywhere in the proceedings before 
the Judge during the two day trial. To speculate and try to infer that this document, 
which was not even discussed at trial, is now relevant in an analysis of this Court's 
review of the lower Court is insincere. Cross examination of this potential 
document and the rebuttal testimony it MAY have solicited MAY have been so 
damaging to Appellant that she obviously chose not to use said potential evidence 
to bolster her position that the Court should consider that evidence over the 2004 
application (Exhibit #28) that it decided to rely on. 
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sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5, 
84P.3dll67. 
This Appeal Court is not tasked with the duty to tell trial Court Judges 
which piece of competing evidence they are to adopt, let alone when compared to 
a document that was not even a part of the trial at all. 
A brief review of just a few of the facts as set forth herein is appropriate 
given the Appellant's position that the Court committed reversible error, meaning 
it's decision was "clearly erroneous" when it determined the amount of 
compensation Appellant was entitled to from the Trust under circumstances where 
Petitioner knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court filings over three years of 
discovery. Through cross-examination at trial Petitioner's testimony was 
repeatedly shown to have been untruthful and evasive. (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order at f 10). In addition, the Appellant admitted under 
cross examination at trial that she repeatedly lied in her deposition under oath 
when she represented that she was NOT entitled to any money from the Trust. (T. 
at 139, lines 16-19). The Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that 
during the three years of discovery and related requests thereto, for every 
discovery request ever done in the case formally or informally, Appellant lied 
when she consistently represented that she was not entitled to any wages for her 
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work for the Trust. (T 2027 at 139, lines 20-25). Up to approximately one week 
before the beginning of trial in this matter, Appellant stood behind those repeated 
lies under oath. (T 2027 at 140 lines 1-4). 
Appellant's pattern of lying also included, in addition to the failure to 
disclose hundreds of thousands of dollars due her for her work for the family 
Trust, lies about her bank accounts. (T 2027 at 141-142, lines 18-4). Appellant 
even went so far as to state under oath in her deposition that she was not even 
employed for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and to the 
current date of the deposition. (T 2027 at 142-143, lines 5-25, and 1-15). 
Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that she was employed during 
all of the years mentioned above by the Trust and the Trust owed her for her 
services. (T 2027 at 143, lines 12-15). Not only did Appellant lie about her 
working, and being owed monies for her services, she represented time and time 
again under oath that all monies she had received from the trust for work she had 
done were "gifts". (T 2027 at 144, lines 1-8). 
Appellant represented under oath in her deposition that she did NOT keep 
track of her time that she worked for the Trust. At trial she submitted an exhibit 
(Exhibit #22) an unsigned, undated, handwritten representation of her alleged 
hours worked for days and years for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148-149, lines 20-25 
and 1-21, and Exhibit #22). 
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The Appellant has no credibility, and her "testimony" in the exhibit she 
created (Exhibit #22) also has no credibility. Just because she wrote the lie 
rather than merely said it, it is the same. The Appellant admits to misleading 
counsel for Appellee during the pendency of the case by not telling the truth "Q: 
Were you not frank with me in your deposition?" A: "I was not frank with you." 
Q: Many times, correct?" A: "Correct". (T 2027 at 149 lines 18-21). Appellant 
claims she lied to Ford Motor Credit to get a loan. (T 2027 at 164, lines 5-6). 
Although initially trying to evade the question, Appellant admitted at trial that 
she has lied repeatedly in this case to get what she wants. (T 2027 at 164, lines 
7-13) the Appellant stated to the Q: "have you lied repeated times in this case, 
Ms. Richins, - repeated times, numerous times, to get what you want? A: 
"Yes"). The Court found that Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility 
and should be given weight only to the extent there was corroborative evidence 
to support it. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at^flO). 
Appellant testified that she is a co-trustee for the Helen Powell Family 
Trust. (T 2027 at 94, lines 18-20). Appellant testified when asked how many 
years she had been a trustee that she didn't know for sure, stating "I don ' t . . . six 
year, seven, I don't know". (T 2027 at 151, lines 7-9). Appellant testified that 
she didn't know what agreement was made as far as payment to her from the 
trust. "I don't really know i t . . ."(T 2027 at 127 line 25). Appellant testified 
that she has authority to write checks from the Trust bank accounts. (T 2027 at 
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153, lines 4-9). Appellant testified that as co-trustee she did not keep a 
contemporaneous record of the time she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148 
lines 20-25, T 2027 at 149, lines 1-3). Appellant testified that she had to re-
create records in order to submit a claim to the Trust as reflected in her 
personally manufactured Appellant's Exhibit #22. (T 2028 at 237, lines 8-10). 
In relation to Exhibit #28, Appellant testified that she did submit the 
application to Ford Motor Credit and that she authorized and stood behind the 
information provided on that application. {See Respondent's exhibit #28, T 2027 
at 166, lines 24-25, T 2027 at 167 lines 1, 2. Exhibit 28). Appellant applied for 
the loan from Ford Motor Company individually, not in the name of the Trust, 
and the application (Exhibit 28) does not indicate Appellant applied in the name 
of the Trust or as trustee of the Trust. (T 2027 at 220 lines 10-14). 
Appellee testified contrary to Exhibit #22 that he in fact disputed the 
accounting of Appellant for hours worked for the trust, and stated contrary to 
Exhibit #22 that he in fact did NOT get paid according to the representations in 
said exhibit. (T 2028 at 387, lines 2-25 to T 2028 at 388, lines 1-5). 
The Court found that although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee of the 
Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggested that 
Petitioner had exercised full control over the Trust's assets and had used the 
Trust structure in whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal 
interest. (SeeF. ofF. 1fl8). 
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Even if this Court determines the trial Court made certain "inferences" to 
come to the Findings set forth, those inferences do not rise to the level of being 
clearly erroneous. For this finding to be reversed, the inference has to be "so 
flawed as to render the inference clearly erroneous. State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, 
1111, 197 P.3d. 628, 631, quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank. 2007 UT 56, If 18, 
184P.3d791. 
In Gillmor v. Gilmor. 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert denied 
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), quoting Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk 
Aktiengeselischaft 564 P.2d 619, 624 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) the Court provided 
guidance on this standard when it stated that an inference to be clearly erroneous 
depends on whether it is "a rational and logical deduction from the facts admitted 
and established by the evidence, when those facts are viewed in the light of 
common experience." The lower Court's finding related to the compensation 
Appellant is entitled to from the Trust she worked for and hid income from for 
years is certainly not "clearly erroneous" under that standard of review. 
In its Findings the trial Court acknowledged and specifically referred to the 
existence of all evidence submitted in reference to unpaid wages claimed by 
Appellant. The trial Court also weighed the sources of the evidence provided. The 
trial Court's findings were well reasoned after a thorough review of all the 
evidence submitted. There is absolutely no evidence established by Appellant that 
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the trial Court committed an error. The trial Court's findings and calculations are 
rational and logical and based on the facts and evidence presented. 
It is the role of the fact finder to assess the credibility of witnesses and to 
weigh the evidence, See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Findings of Facts, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial Court to Judge the 
credibility of the witnesses.") State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 
1990) 
The Ford Credit Application (Exhibit #28) was submitted by Appellant to 
secure a loan to purchase a vehicle. Since it is a crime to knowingly provide false 
information to a lending institution, the applicant has a rather stringent obligation 
to provide truthful information. All financial institutions are required to follow 
government and state regulations in lending procedures. We can reasonable expect 
that Ford Credit required a credit check of the credit worthiness of the applicant 
and a review of the debt to income ratio to determine the applicant's ability to 
repay the loan. Ford Motor Credit approved Appellant for a loan based on the 
information provided in the application. The vehicle was purchased with funds 
from this loan and titled in Appellant's name. 
Furthermore, it would seem that Appellant to this date continues to earn the 
amount imputed to her by the trial Court in this matter. Appellant submitted a 
sworn financial statement which she used to support her efforts to secure an 
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"Undertaking On Appeal", filed July 14, 2009, wherein she claims post trial wages 
from the Powell Family Trust: June 2005 thru June 2009, in an amount of 
$171,500. That amount, divided by the relevant time period covered, together 
with the 10% monthly rental income the Appellant is entitled to as reflected in her 
Exhibit 22, equals a monthly gross income of $3,802.17. It should be duly noted 
that the amount the trial Court imputed and in which Appellant brings before this 
Court on appeal is likely the same amount Appellant continues to earn from the 
Trust for her services, even to this date, well over a year and half one half after the 
trial in this matter. (See R. 2024, Statement of Assets and Liabilities (As of June 
30, 2009) (See Appellant's exhibit #22 10% Rents 8/01/2001). 
II. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it 
Chose Not To Deduct $27,207.59 from Appellants Earnings. 
The Appellant would have the Appeals Court once again (as attempted in 
Issue I above) force the lower Court to adopt Appellant's desired "evidence" over 
compelling and credible contrary evidence. The record is clear that the lower 
Court's Findings were not clearly erroneous when it found that Appellant's 
testimony was simply not believable as to receipt of $27,207.59 from the Trust as 
compensation. 
We once again have to go to Appellant's undated, unsigned, handwritten 
Exhibit #22 to analyze this claim. The last page of this exhibit included a 
computer printout allegedly from a Trust agent (which Appellant controlled) of 
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alleged payments the Appellant claims she received from the Trust during the 
same time period she was contending (for over three years) she was not employed, 
not owed wages of any kind, and in fact any monies she received from the Trust 
were "gifts". Now that she has been found to have been lying all this time, she 
wants to force the lower Court to adopt her unsubstantiated rewriting of history. 
Exhibit #22 is nothing more than a self serving, uncorroborated, faulty, and 
unreliable document (or more precisely set of documents) that Appellant created 
on the eve of trial to try and reduce her damages when it became apparent her 
scheme to hide her compensation from the Trust in the amount of over $300,000 
was going to be exposed. 
The Appellant spends substantial time trying to extrapolate from the 
findings, new facts that would alter the outcome of the Decree. "To succeed in its 
challenge to findings of fact, [appellant] may not simply reargue its position based 
on selective excerpts of evidence presented to the trial court." ProMax Dev. Corp. 
v. Mattson, 943 P.2d at 255 (Utah 1984). Appellant cannot re-write history, nor 
can she erase it. Appellant puts forth a lengthy and elaborate effort in trying to 
convince this court that she did not have the ability to understand common logic, 
let alone articulate in words her response(s) when questioned about her duties as 
co-trustee to the family Trust. And yet, Appellant would have this Court believe 
that she could re-construct a detailed spread sheet of the hours that she worked for 
the trust, and that she could recreate a document that claims to have 
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"disbursements" from the Trust. Not one of the disbursements were supported 
with any negotiated transaction or copy of item presented for payment. No checks 
were presented. No proof of deposits was presented. No witnesses of who 
generated the computer printout were called, and nothing credible was put into 
evidence that supported the new claim. Exhibit #22 is simply not credible. 
The Appellant relies on a footnote mischaracterization in the Court's 
Findings to try and force the lower Court into a Finding that it clearly did NOT 
make as to Exhibit #22. The Court said in footnote 5 on page 4 of its Findings, in 
commenting on the claim that Appellant "alleges" the parties were paid this 
$27,207.56 as their "combined earnings from services to the Trust", that this is an 
assertion of Appellant, and that Appellee did not dispute that the amount was 
consumed by the parties in meeting their marital expenses. 
It is true that Appellee did not dispute Appellant's unsupported testimony 
that the "alleged" amount was consumed, as Appellee had no information to do so. 
How could Appellee prove to the contrary the funds were never received and 
were merely made up by Appellant to try and reduce her compensation claim? 
Remember this claim only came up days before the trial began. That is 
impossible, other than to simply deny the existence of said funds, and to attack the 
reliability of the self serving Exhibit #22, which Appellee did quite successfully. 
The lower Court agreed in its analysis, and after having referred directly to 
the claim of Appellant to the offset, in the next paragraph of its Findings, ]f 14, 
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it rejected in total the content and claims as asserted in said Exhibit. The lower 
Court considered the proffered evidence, and simply chose not to give it any 
weight. That is clearly in the purview of the lower Court, who listened to all the 
witnesses and reviewed all the documents and evidence submitted and made a well 
reasoned decision on the evidence. To try and extrapolate a footnote into clear 
error is again without merit and support. "An appellate Court will not reverse the 
findings of fact of a trial Court sitting without a jury unless they are. . . clearly 
erroneous." (quoting MacKav v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995). 
Moreover, in those instances in which the trial Court's findings include inferences 
drawn from the evidence, the findings will be upheld unless the logic upon which 
their extrapolation from the evidence was based "is so flawed as to render the 
inference clearly erroneous:' State v. Briggs, (2008) UT 75, %l 1, 197 P.3d 
628,631, quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, (2007) UT 56, ^ 18, 184 P.3d 791. 
The Court clearly found that there was NO offset to its determination of 
compensation owed to the Appellant by the family Trust. 
In support of the lower Court's finding that the parties did NOT receive 
these funds as compensation for services, Appellee states again some of the 
relevant facts the Court had available to her at the time: 
1. Appellant stated under oath in her deposition that she was not even 
employed for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and to the 
current date of the deposition. (T 2027 at 142-143, lines 5-25, and 1-15). 
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2. Appellant stated during her deposition that all monies she had 
received from the trust for work she had done were "gifts". (T 2027 at 144, lines 
1-8). 
3. Appellant even went so far as to say she has not received 
compensation for working for the Trust back to 1998. (T 2027 at 144-145, lines 
24-10). 
4. Appellant represented under oath in her deposition that she did NOT 
keep track of her time that she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148-149, lines 
20-25 and 1-21, and Exhibit #22). 
5. Although initially trying to evade the question, Appellant admitted at 
trial that she has lied repeatedly in this case to get what she wants. (T 2027 at 
164 lines 7-13 the Appellant stated to the Q: "have you lied repeated times in this 
case, Ms. Richins, - repeated times, numerous times, to get what you want? A: 
"Yes"). 
6. The Court found that Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility 
and should be given weight only to the extent there was corroborative evidence 
to support it. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at ]fl0). 
7. Appellant testified that she is a co-trustee for the Helen Powell 
Family Trust. (T 2027 at 94, lines 18-20). 
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8. Appellant testified when asked how many years she had been a 
trustee that she didn't know for sure, stating "I don ' t . . . six year, seven, I don't 
know". (T 2027, at 151, lines 7-9). 
9. Appellant testified that she didn't know what agreement was made 
as far as payment to her from the trust. "I don't really know it . . ." (T 2027 at 
127 line 25). 
10. Appellant testified that she has authority to write checks from the 
Trust bank accounts. (T 2027 at 153, lines 4-9). 
11. Appellant testified that as co-trustee she did not keep a 
contemporaneous record of the time she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148, 
lines 20-25, T 2027 at 149, lines 1-3). 
12. Appellant testified that she had to re-create records in order to 
submit a claim to the Trust as reflected in her personally manufactured 
Appellant's Exhibit #22. (T 2028 at 237, lines 8-10). 
13. Appellant submitted two separate Financial Declarations to the 
Court, neither of which described or listed her claim to wages owed from the 
Trust, among other glaring omissions and misstatements under oath. {See Pet. ex. 
59, Resp. ex. 33). 
14. The court found that although Petitioner had control of the Trust and 
could have paid herself for her services during the time they accrued, Appellant 
29 
chose not to withdraw those funds but to shelter them in the Trust as 
unrecognized income". (See F. of F. P. 5 ^|15). 
15. Appellee testified contrary to Exhibit #22 that he in fact disputed the 
accounting of Appellant for hours worked for the trust, and stated contrary to 
Exhibit #22 that he in fact did NOT get paid according to the representations in 
said exhibit. (T 2028 at 387, lines 2-25 to T 2028 at 388, lines 1-5). 
16. The Court found that although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee 
of the Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggested 
that Petitioner had exercised full control over the Trust's assets and had used the 
Trust structure in whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal 
interest. (SeeF.ofF. 118). 
17. Moreover, Appellant's Exhibit #22 contending receipt of $27,207.50 
in compensation from the Trust was only manufactured by the Appellant in 
anticipation of trial, its foundational basis in fact denied repeatedly by Appellant 
under oath throughout the three year discovery time period. 
18. Exhibit #22 was presented to Appellee on the eve of trial, after all 
witnesses and trial preparation had been basically completed. 
19. Exhibit #22 was admitted into evidence to show how Appellant 
came to the conclusions and amounts she wanted the Court to adopt as to her 
hidden compensation. 
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She presented NO evidence4 to corroborate the document other than her own 
testimony. 
Exhibit #50, the letter from the attorney for the Trust, states '7 have 
reviewed with my client, Helen M. Powell (the mother of Appellant), the claim in 
the amount of $118,699.44 that you submitted on behalf of Rita Richins 
(Appellant). Helen confirms that Rita did a lot of work for her and Helen felt 
that the hours listed for Rita of10,809.33 hours was reasonable for the time 
period listed from August 2000 through May 10, 2005. " No independent 
analysis was presented, no additional corroborative evidence provided, and 
nothing is stated in the letter to give credibility to the claim. In fact, the Trust 
would be unable to support the "accounting and claims" because there were no 
records kept according to its own trustee. The Trust was faced with the reality of 
having to pay a potential claim of over $300,000 (as the Court determined 
thereafter based on the more credible evidence) and jumped at the opportunity to 
agree to pay approximately one third of that amount. This letter also comes from 
the Trust's own counsel, of which Appellant as trustee of the Trust managed as 
part of her duties for the Trust. 
4
 She did NOT present a witness from the Trust. She did deliver a letter 
from the Trust counsel (Exhibit #50) dated July 28, 2008, less than one week 
before the first day of trial that in NO way provides any proof of the content of 
Exhibit #22, but merely states to the effect that the Trust acknowledges the claim 
made by Exhibit #22. 
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No discovery was conducted in relation to Exhibits #22 or #50, and all prior 
discovery was in contradiction to the very premise and alleged factual basis of 
both exhibits. There is nothing mentioning this claim in her Docketing 
Statement regarding the $27,205.50. 
There is simply no credible evidence to corroborative Appellant's "re-
creation" of the alleged wages she now claims to have earned, nor the page 
where she for the first time alleges that she did in fact get paid for some of her 
services in the amount of $27,207.56. 
There is no credible evidence of any kind to support Appellant's claims that 
$27,207.50 in wages were ever paid to either party. When questioned by the 
Court if he [Appellee] ever received payments of check, cash or any negotiable 
instrument for wages from the Trust Appellee responded "No". (T 2028 at 387 
line 18 at 388 line 4). Appellant's testimony gives cause for the Court to 
question the validity of Exhibit #22, as Appellant has admitted to lying under 
oath, " . . . to get what [she] want[s]". (T 2027 at 164 lines 9-13) (See also, F. of 
F. and Conclusions Of Law, TJ10). 
In fact, in Appellant's Brief on Appeal she admits that the accounting of 
Exhibit #22, even in the light she is attempting to use it, is unreliable and the 
computation almost impossible. In her footnote #14 on page 26 of her brief, it is 
clear that Appellant herself is unable to make the calculations square up. The 
evidence is so unreliable that the Court reasonably decided to simply give no 
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weight to said Exhibit #22 and claim, and to instead believe the Appellant's pre 
trial position of the monies (if any) being "gifts". It is clearly not erroneous to do 
so under the facts. It is not wise to second guess the fact finder in a situation 
where there are so many red flags on a single piece of "evidence". 
Even a cursory review of the content of Appellant's Exhibit #22 shows how 
unreliable and faulty it is. The Appellant presents her alleged "recreated" time 
sheet for the year 2001, more specifically March 4, 2001 to April 7, 2001 which 
is a five week period. In that five week period, Appellant's accounting that 
forms the basis for her claim of compensation indicates she worked 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week for 5 straight weeks. Out of the 35 days only 3 days have less 
than 24 hours claimed. Appellant claims she worked a total of 702 hours for 
March, 2001, which if the court accepted her hourly wage of $12.00 per hour, 
would total $8,424 for the month. 
There is no clear error in this Finding. "[W]e review the trial court's 
findings of fact for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 
(UtahCt.App. 1997). 
III. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When 
it Awarded the Appellant Her Unpaid Wages as Part of 
the Division of Marital Assets. 
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The trial Court properly imputed compensation from the Trust to 
Appellant. Even the Appellant, finally, on the eve of trial admitted that she was 
entitled to compensation from the Trust; she only disputed the amount and time 
frame. The evidentiary battle ensued on those issues, and Appellant lost. The 
Court heard both sides and made an informed ruling. The Court stated 
"Therefore, it is fair and appropriate to impute $312,740 in unrecognized income 
to Appellant for the period July 1998-MaylO, 2005, rather than to accept the 
$118,700, that she and the Trust have acknowledged to be a Marital asset". (See 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order ^fl5, emphasis added). The Court 
clearly considered all points of view. 
The contention Appellant pursues in this part of her Appeal is the premise 
that the Court committed clear error when it awarded Appellant, as part of her 
equal split of the marital assets, the compensation claim she has against the Trust, 
of which she is a co trustee. Appellant claims that the compensation owed by the 
Trust is not "liquid", and therefore the Court committed reversible error when it 
treated the asset as "fully liquidated" when dividing the marital estate. The Court 
did not treat the asset as "fully liquidated" and explained its reasoning clearly as 
stated previously that the asset is not illiquid. This division of assets is one that 
should not be interfered with given the lower Courts better view of how assets 
should be divided under the circumstances. 
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The Appellant foresaw the ruling at trial on this asset, and argued the 
liquidity issue there. In fact, the lower Court specifically addressed the concerns 
and position of the Appellant in its Findings at fs 16 and 18. At f^ 16, the Court 
acknowledged "Petitioner offers two reasons for why she believes it would be 
unfair to credit Respondent (Appellee) with half of the value of her deferred 
income: ...(2) because the Trust does not have sufficient liquid assets to pay 
Petitioner (Appellant) in a lump sum. Petitioner urges the Court to discount the 
debt because of the "risk" that she may not be able to collect the full amount from 
the Trust. The Court finds that Petitioner's arguments have little merit". 
Findings at page 5, ^ 16. Although this was an effort to reduce the value of the 
compensation, the logic surely is the same and the analysis as well as to the 
distribution of the asset. 
At Tf 18 of its Findings the lower Court made it clear that the evidence 
supported her distribution of the marital estate so far as the deferred compensation 
claim. The Court stated, "As to the "risk" of not collecting on the unpaid 
earnings, although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee of the Trust (with her 
mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggests that Petitioner has 
exercised full control over the Trust's assets and has used the Trust structure in 
whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal interests ". The 
Court finds further, "Indeed, according to Petitioner's own testimony, during the 
same time she was deferring payments to herself from the Trust for her services, 
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she was paying herself and her siblings $500 per month as gifts from the Trust " 
On further review of the evidence the Court went on to find that "She has 
presented no corroborative evidence to support her claim that during the relevant 
time period the Tust was so illiquid that it could not pay her for the services. To 
be sure, Petitioner's exhibit 50, a letter dated July 28, 2008, states that the Trust 
presently lacks enough "liquid" assets to retire the admitted Trust's financial 
obligation to Petitioner. However, nothing in that letter addresses the Trust's 
inability during the relevant period (1998-2005) to pay the amounts it owed". 
The Court then concluded most appropriately, "Indeed, it is evident from 
the gifts paid out during that period (together with rents collected from Trust 
properties) that there were liquid assets available to the Trust at the time. It is 
also clear from the testimony at trial that the Trust presently owns a number of 
other assets that could be sold to retire that obligation ". Then, referring to the 
rest of the marital estate which in total had a net value of several hundred thousand 
dollars, the Court stated, "Moreover, that is not the only option available. 
Because these parties have considerable other asserts to their name, there is 
always the option of offsetting the value of Respondent's share of imputed income 
from the Trust against other assets of the parties".( See Findings, ^ J18). 
A valuation or distribution issue is reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, [^44, 176 P.3d 
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476 ("We defer to the trial Court in its findings of fact related to property 
valuation and distribution. See Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209,1211 (Utah App. 
1991) "Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous 
standard of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
"We afford the trial court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity." 
Leppert v. Leppert 2009 Utah App 10, \ 9, 200 P.3d 223. 
"Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's property division 
determination in a divorce action only if there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 2003 Utah 
App 282, t 8, 76 P.3d 716. (emphasis added). 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining . . property 
distribution in divorce cases, and [their decisions] will be upheld on appeal unless 
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated". Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 Utah App 11, j^ 8, 176 P.3d (omission in original), (emphasis 
added). 
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"To succeed in its challenge to findings of fact, [appellant] may not simply 
reargue its position based on selective excerpts of evidence presented to the trial 
court." ProMax Dev. Corp v. Mattson, 943 P.2d at 255.See Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1287 (Utah 1987) (giving trial court broad latitude in 
dividing Marital estate). 
The Appellant takes the untenable position that she is being punished 
because she was awarded her compensation claims against the Trust she controls 
in the division of marital assets. The reason this seems not genuine is because the 
Appellant now states to the effect, shame on you for believing me when I lied for 
over three years in the litigation about compensation, and now that I am found to 
be entitled to compensation, you should not make me be the responsible party to 
collect same. 
Appellant interestingly enough in her argument takes the position that the 
fiduciary duty she may have under the law prevents her from doing what she has 
been doing with this Trust's assets for years. To use this as a defense is to ask this 
Court to allow her to use her alleged duties to prevent her from facing the 
consequences she caused by her previous violation of those very duties. This 
argument alone is reason enough to award her the asset. Who better to collect 
against her own Trust? With the contrary and "flip-flopping" positions taken by 
the Appellant under oath as to the issue of compensation owed her by the Trust 
she manages, to require the Appellee to collect this asset would be nonsense. 
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Appellee would be saddled with the task of trying to prove facts that have been 
intentionally withheld from him, distorted, and stated to be 180 degrees opposite 
in some cases. It was the decision of the Appellant to defer her income, lie about 
it, hide it even when under oath, and try to manipulate the Court to find an amount 
due of approximately 1/3 of the truth. To ask the Appeals Court to require 
Appellee to try and sort this out is not supported by the facts, fairness, common 
sense, nor logic. 
It is helpful to consider the previous stated facts in this brief in determining 
whether the Court's decision on the distribution of the marital estate assets was 
clearly erroneous. The Appellee has stated several facts above, and rather than 
repeat them again, merely asks the reader to review them in consideration of the 
Court's finding that Appellant, not Appellee, should be awarded the compensation 
claim against the Trust she controls. 
In Appellant's third post trial attempt in her Motion To Stay Pending 
Appeal, she incorporates her Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of June 30, 
2009. (See R. at 2023-2024) This statement includes a substantial previously 
undisclosed asset (a personal injury claim against the Trust for several hundred 
thousand dollars that clearly existed at the time of discovery and trial). Appellant 
now has a total claim against the Powell Trust and Helen Powell for $590,300 and 
declares her total net worth at approximately $750,000. This is a further reason 
this Appeals Court should not disrupt the property distribution of the lower Court. 
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The dishonest actions of Appellant have complicated the very asset she 
endeavored to hide. 
It should also be noted when reviewing the issue on appeal as to the 
liquidity of claims against the Trust, that under Liabilities on Appellant's Financial 
Statement she lists a loan from Helen Powell for $50,000, which Appellant has not 
paid back and testified that it could be applied to wages earned, from the Trust. 
{See R. at 2024) (T 2027 at 251 line 21 at 252 line 8). 
Also represented on a Financial Statement is an entry for $70,000 from the 
Powell Family Trust for "advances against claims". It appears that Appellant 
continues her efforts to hide her compensation by taking "loans" from the Trust 
rather than compensation so as to avoid taxes, and of course to continue the lies 
she has stated that she is not entitled to any income. 
She now has received $120,000 in cash from the Trust that common sense 
would tell us was to reduce the debt the Trust owes her. The Trust agreed it owed 
her no less than $ 118,000, and has seemingly paid her more than that already. The 
argument on the liquidity of the claim against the Trust is suspect given these 
facts. It is clear that Appellant is not concerned about her fiduciary duties and 
continues to take loans from the Trust she manages, all while she claims that same 
Trust owes her almost $600,000. {See R. at 2023 - 2024). 
In Exhibit #50, the letter dated July, 2008 from the as attorney for the Trust 
used in support of Appellant's claim for compensation, the attorney states, "Helen 
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does not have enough liquid assets at the present time to immediately pay the 
entire $118,699.44. However, she will work with her accountant to pay what she 
can now and then she will pay the balance to Rita as soon as she can convert some 
of her fixed assets into cash. Please be patient with my client for a few months 
while she obtains the rest of the funds she will need to pay the balance she owes to 
Rita". (See Exhibit #50). 
It is clear that the Trust has some liquidity (at least back in July 2008 when 
this letter was written), and that it has sufficient assets to become more liquid 
within only a few months of July 2008 (almost 2 years ago now) by converting 
some assets into cash. Appellant is the trustee of this Trust and although she tries 
to fashion Exhibit #50 as an independent letter from the Trust, common sense 
would dictate that she continues to control the Trust and is trying to delay once 
again her compensation to bolster this Appeal. Why would a Trust properly 
managed by an independent person not tell a claimant who is requesting money 
for services that loans to that person in the amount of $120,000 should not be 
applied to the debt? The liquidity claim fails on its own lack of merit. 
IV. Issue: The Decree of Divorce Entered in this Case is Not a 
"Punitive" Decree and is Not Contrary to Utah Law. 
Appellant frames the issue of punitive decree as a question of law to avoid 
the marshaling requirement. In doing so, however, she fails to take advantage of 
the opportunity that marshaling provides; to take a second look at the issue in light 
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of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Consequently, the issue 
raised is not meritorious, because it is not discussed in light of the controlling case 
law or the controlling standards of review. All facts as set forth herein need to be 
considered in the global issue of determining a so called "punitive Decree". 
Since Appellant claims the "effect" of the Decree is what is punitive, the 
Court must remember that "We afford the trial court considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interest, and its actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity." Leppert v. Leppert 2009 UT App 10, If 9, 200 P.3d 223 
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ^8, 76 P.3d 716). 
"Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's property 
Division determination in a divorce action only if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion." (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
The Court went to great lengths to produce a detailed accounting of the 
distribution of marital assets in the Decree, entered April 15, 2009. A review of 
the Decree makes it clear that both parties received an equal amount of the marital 
assets following the trial of this matter. There is absolutely no evidence inferred or 
otherwise to claim the trial Court's findings and distribution of assets under the 
Decree are "punitive" to either party. There are no damages awarded to infer the 
Court's findings were based on bad faith, malice, fraud, violence or evil intent and 
no inference designed as a deterrent for future actions of either party. Appellant 
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cannot claim the Decree is punitive simply because she feels the Decree is unfair 
to her. 
Appellant has tried to manipulate the trial Court's figures to manufacture 
and conjure up an appearance of a disproportionate award of marital assets. 
Appellant's mathematical assumptions are contrary to the trial Court's Findings 
and the Decree, and cannot be used to support her claim that the Decree is not fair 
and just as to both parties. A quick example of this is the Appellant's statement at 
page 40, the last paragraph, wherein she states that she was awarded "$191,171.35 
in marital assets" compared to the Appellee being awarded "$380,372.83, which is 
66.55%". This is a statement that flies in the face of the clear reading of the 
Decree and the 50/50 allocation of marital assets set forth therein. In order to 
support this math, one would have to assume (among other things) that ALL of the 
deferred compensation awarded Appellant is worthless. The Appellant completely 
disregards the award of compensation to her for her wages owed by the Trust. 
Note that Appellant has already received $120,000 cash in the form of loans from 
the Trust toward this claim, and she submitted Exhibit (#50) that indicated she 
would in fact be paid for her compensation claim, no later than a few months after 
July 2008. We are approaching two years since the Trust itself agreed Appellant 
would be paid a substantial amount! How can appellant now state to this Court in 
good faith that she has NO value in the compensation claim awarded to her? 
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Appellant revisits the alimony issue and the Protective Order5 issue in 
discussing her position that the Decree is punitive. The Court merely enforced 
Appellant's own under oath withdrawal of the alimony claim (and thereafter 
Appellant's prevention of discovery on the underlying facts). It is interesting to 
note that the Appeal herein does NOT claim the Court committed error in taking 
such action. Alimony is not being appealed, yet it is being stretched beyond 
recognition as somehow relevant to the fact that the Court was punishing the 
Appellant. If this were the case, she surely would have appealed the alimony 
issue. There never was any legitimate alimony issue in this case and Appellant 
finally recognizes the same by not appealing the Court's ruling thereon. 
"The Appellate Court will not re-weigh the evidence, but view evidence that 
supports the trial court's decision in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings. The broad discretion accorded the trial court in making findings, 
particularly in the context of a divorce proceeding, simply acknowledges that the 
trial court is seeking to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and that 
the trial court is best suited to weigh the evidence because "the trial judge has 
As to the Protective Order, the record needs to be set straight. Appellee 
was asked at trial if there was any domestic violence that took place. He answered 
"No", because there wasn't any. Appellee was originally charged with D.V. but 
was able to prove Appellant lied on the police report to obtain a Protective Order 
to have him removed from his home that he had owned for 8 years prior to the 
party's marriage. All Domestic Violence (D.V.) charges were dropped against 
Appellee, including simple assault D V and damage/interruption of a 
communication device. The only charge he pled guiltyto and was charged 
with is one class C misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct under §76-9-102. 
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observed the facts, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Ut 1998) quoting State v. 
Pena, 869 P. 2d 939 (Utah 1994). 
The Appellant admits that the Decree is not punitive on its face. Instead the 
Appellant claims the "effect" of the Decree is so harmful to her that it is punitive 
and that the lower Court judge must have meant to punish her. The only way this 
argument holds any substance at all is if the Appellant prevails on her other appeal 
issues herein. Accordingly, Appellee incorporates his argument and facts on the 
other issues herein to support the trial Court's ruling. 
Appellant, as shown herein, has simply ignored the Findings of the Court 
herein. The trial Court had the arduous task of being fact-finder in this case 
wherein the difficulty of every issue resulted from the actions of Appellant and her 
propensity to lie. The lower Court literally left no stone unturned in her search of 
truth in this case. Even when, at the eve of trial, Appellant finally admitted that 
the Trust did indeed owe her money, when throughout the litigation she adamantly 
denied any such claim, the Court could have concluded that Appellant was 
actually hiding assets. The trial Court could have in fact done more to reach an 
equitable result under the circumstances and awarded the Appellee more of the 
assets to compensate him. After all, Appellant intentionally failed to disclose her 
claim to wages as an asset, and intentionally took efforts to hide that fact causing 
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this case to even go to trial at all. The modest award of a partial amount of 
attorney fees to Appellee at the trial level, when Appellee sought substantially 
more, clearly indicates the Court did not punish Appellant. 
After recognizing Appellant's inappropriate conduct with regards to her 
misrepresentations, fabrications and lies under oath in depositions, and in a court 
of law, her counsel now infers that the trial Court may have ruled against 
Appellant to punish her. The trial Court did not make any indication that the 
Findings were anything but a fair and equitable distribution. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must 
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of 
conviction that a mistake has been made.' State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, ^5, 84 
P.3d 11167 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
The plain error exception enables the appellate court to "balance the need 
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 
116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989). At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit 
us to avoid injustice. "State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 n. 8. To demonstrate plain 
error, a defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
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appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
"State v.Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court did not commit error as to any of the issues Appellant raises 
and there is ample evidence in the record to sustain the trial Court's Findings and 
Conclusions. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case, 
the trial Court's ruling implements an equitable division of the marital estate. The 
Appellant was awarded over $200,000 cash in October 2005 under a temporary 
Order in the case. She was awarded the monies she had received under the 
Decree, and she was awarded the $120,000 in cash "loans" that she could, and 
probably already has converted to her ownership as a result of an admitted claim 
for compensation against the Trust. There is simply no punitive aspect to this case 
whatsoever. To claim that it is punitive for the Court to point out the credibility 
issues in a trial is confusing. This case turned on credibility, and the Appellant 
must take responsibility for her actions. 
Appellee requests Attorney Fees and Costs for the frivolous issues pursued 
on appeal. Appellee requests an award of attorney fees and costs under Utah R. 
App. 33 and 24 for Appellant pursuing a frivolous appeal. A frivolous appeal 
includes "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
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based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah 
R. App. P. 33(b); see also Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988) 
The Utah Court has found, "when a party who received attorney fees below 
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998). 
Based on the well reasoned rulings of the trial Court, the Decree of Divorce 
entered should stand. The Appellant has failed in her attempt to show that the 
Court committed reversible error when it imputed $3,800 of unpaid earnings, 
chose not to deduct any wages or income the parties "allegedly" received from the 
Trust, and awarded the compensation asset to Appellant. There is no Punitive 
Decree. Based thereon, this Appeal should be dismissed and Appellee awarded 
his fees and costs to defend same. 
s ^ * K i a ^ Q f April, DATED t h i s ^ ^ ^ M a ^ o  il 2010. 
TOM D BRANCH, LLC 
Tom D Branch 
Attorney for Respondent!Appellee James E. Richins 
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ADDENDUM 
Decree of Divorce 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
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OCT ! 5 2106 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UIAiL. 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
RITA Y. RICHINS, : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Petitioner, OF LAW, AND ORDER 
vs. 
: Case No. 054902600 
JAMES E. RICHINS, 
Respondent. : Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
f 1 A bench trial was held in this case on August 4 and 5, 2008. Petitioner was present and 
represented by her counsel, Mary Paxman McGee. Respondent was present and represented by 
his counsel, Tom D. Branch. The Court heard testimony and received exhibits offered by both 
parties, and took the matter under advisement. After review of the testimony and exhibits the 
Court now enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1f2 At the time this divorce Petition was filed, the parties had been residents of Salt Lake 
County for at least three months prior to filing. Complaint, at ^[1, Answer, at ^[1. 
1f3 The parties began cohabiting in May or June, 1982, they were married on May 26, 1984. 
The parties have no children in common. 
1f4 The parties separated on May 10, 2005; Petitioner filed her Petition for Divorce on May 
12, 2005 alleging emotional and physical abuse.1 
]As a result of an incident that occurred on or about May 10, 2005, Petitioner obtained a 
Protective Order against Respondent on May 25, 2005. Concurrently, Respondent was charged 
with two misdemeanor domestic violence charges: Simple Assault (DV) and 
Damaging/Interrupting a Communication Device. On September 1, 2006, Respondent entered a 
plea to an amended misdemeanor count of Disorderly Conduct (DV). At sentencing on 
September 11, 2006, Respondent received a fine of $500 which was suspended upon proof of 
completion of 75 hours of community service. He was also ordered to undergo an alcohol and 




Tf5 On or about October 14, 2005, the parties entered into a Stipulation concerning the partial 
distribution of marital assets, the terms of which were read into the record before Commissioner 
Casey. The terms of the stipulation were reduced to writing and entered as temporary orders by 
this Court on October 27, 2005. 
Tf6 Following extensive pretrial motions the case was certified for trial by Commissioner 
Casey on November 28, 2007 on the following issues: 
• The validity of Petitioner's waiver of alimony. 
• Petitioner's request to have the Decree enter on the grounds of physical or 
emotional cruelty based on past domestic violence. 
• An offset or credit sought by Respondent based on his claim that Petitioner had 
sheltered certain assets (i.e., compensation earned over several years for managing 
a family trust) for the purpose of making those assets unavailable to Respondent. 
Division of marital assets. 
• Respondent's request to have the existing protective order dismissed. 
• Each party's request for attorneys fees. 
Validity of Alimony Waiver 
\1 In her Petition for Divorce Petitioner initially requested alimony. In subsequent 
proceedings Petitioner disclaimed the alimony request, and based on that disclaimer Petitioner 
successfully resisted Respondent's efforts to conduct discovery about her financial status. 
Thereafter, Petitioner reasserted her alimony request. This Court ruled that Petitioner had waived 
her alimony claim. Minute Entry of May 15, 2008. Nevertheless, at trial Petitioner sought to 
proffer grounds in support of a renewed claim. Petitioner has provided no facts that would 
justify a change to the Court's prior rulings. No material facts have changed since the last time 
the Court addressed this issue. 
Petitioner's Request to Enter Divorce Decree on the Basis of Fault 
f 8 In the Divorce Petition filed May 12, 2005, Petitioner requested that the Decree enter on 
grounds of "irreconcilable differences." Since then, however, Petitioner has modified her 
position and now insists that the Decree be entered on the basis of Respondent's "fault." 
Petitioner has a couple of related hurdles to overcome in pursuing fault-based grounds. The first 
issue is that Petitioner never sought leave to file an Amended Petition seeking relief on those 
from the evaluators. Respondent was placed on unsupervised, good conduct probation to the 
court for 12 months. Petitioner's Ex. 1. 
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grounds.2 The second issue is that the DV incident upon which she relies for her present position 
had just taken place a couple of days earlier, yet it was not referenced in her Petition. Petitioner 
has not explained why it is now so critical that the Decree enter on those grounds, even though 
they have never been explicitly pled. 
[^9 Issues of fault are most relevant in the context of adjudications involving alimony and 
child custody. Neither of those reasons apply here because Petitioner waived any alimony claim 
and the parties have no children in common. 
Tf 10 Although Respondent's conviction in a domestic violence-related count could support 
entering a fault-based Decree, there is plenty of fault attributable to both parties. In addition to 
the D V conviction, Respondent has acted wrongfully at other times, such as when he emptied out 
various marital bank accounts within days of the parties' separation. For her part, Petitioner has 
also acted wrongfully. Specifically, Petitioner has knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court 
filings (e.g., her financial declarations) and during her depositions.3 Through cross-examination 
at trial Petitioner's testimony was repeatedly shown to have been untruthful and evasive. Not 
only has Petitioner lied in the context of these proceedings, at trial Petitioner was forced to admit 
to lying numerous times in various other contexts (e.g., to Ford Motor Credit in order to qualify 
for a car loan, to the Salt Lake City Credit Union in an account application) in order uto get what 
[she] want[s]." As a result, the Court finds that Petitioner's testimony utterly lacks credibility and 
should be given weight only to the extent there is corroborative evidence to support it. 
Therefore, if Petitioner insists on a fault-based divorce, the Court finds that fault should be 
equally assigned to both parties. Alternatively, the Decree should enter on grounds of 
irreconcilable differences as pled in the Petition. 
Respondent's Request for Offset/Credit on Distribution of Assets on Basis that Petitioner Hid 
Marital Assets in the Family Trust She Controls. 
2To be sure, as referenced at note 1, supra, there has been at least one documented 
incident of domestic violence during the parties' marriage. That incident, which took place on or 
about May 10, 2005, resulted in the parties' physical separation and in Respondent's subsequent 
guilty plea to an amended misdemeanor count of Disorderly Conduct (DV). 
Petitioner filed two financial declarations, one dated January 31, 2006, and the other 
dated September 14, 2007. In these filings Petitioner declared, under penalty of perjury, that she 
had no income, no employment, and no debt. In the 2006 declaration she also stated that she had 
no bank accounts, although in the 2007 she lists a number of accounts that had existed at the time 
she filed the 2006 declaration. In neither statement did she acknowledge what she subsequently 
admitted at trial-that she has a viable claim against her family Trust for approximately $118,700 
in past wages. In her depositions Petitioner had denied any right to wages from the Trust, and 
further testified that the information in the financial declaration was accurate. At trial, however, 
Petitioner was forced to admit that most, if not all, of her representations in those financial 
declarations were untruthful. 
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HI 1 Respondent contends that Petitioner has "earned over $45,000 per year since 1995 and 
hidden that money in the Powell Family Trust" (the "Trust") by declining to receive payment 
from the Trust that she manages as co-trustee with her mother. Respondent requests that the 
Court impute and recognize that income and credit him with "an amount equal to his equitable 
share in Petitioner's hidden income when the Court divides the estate." Respondent's Trial Brief, 
at 7. Specifically, Respondent asks that the Court impute to Petitioner income or assets in the 
amount of $399,200 for her work managing the Trust. 
1fl2 The parties disagree as to when Petitioner began working for her family's Trust. 
Petitioner claims she did not begin working for the Trust until 2000, Respondent claims she 
began in 1995. For the reasons stated hereafter, the Court imputes Trust employment to 
Petitioner from at least July 1, 1998. 
Tfl3 In support of her position Petitioner offers Petitioner's Ex.22. Petitioner alleges that this 
undated, unsigned, handwritten exhibit reflects the hours she worked for the Trust between 
August 2000 and May 10, 2005.4 According to the exhibit, during that period Petitioner worked a 
total of 10,809.33 hours on behalf of the Trust at a rate of $12.00 per hour, resulting in earnings 
to her of $129,711.96. Petitioner further claims that during that same period Respondent 
performed 259 hours of work on behalf of the Trust (also at $12.00 per hour), for a total of 
$3,108.00 in earnings to Respondent. As reflected in the exhibit, Petitioner alleges that of the 
parties' combined earnings from services to the Trust, they were paid $27,207.50.5 If Petitioner's 
contentions are accepted, it is evident that Petitioner has failed to collect $105,612.46 for hourly 
work she performed on behalf of the Trust. But this is not all. Petitioner has also acknowledged 
that another part of her compensation was a "management fee" of 10% of rents collected from 
properties owned by the Trust. According to the exhibit, that results in another $13,086.98 in 
unpaid compensation to Petitioner. In total, Petitioner now concedes that the Trust she manages 
is holding at least $118,699.44 in compensation due to her and which she has chosen not to 
collect.6 She also acknowledges this is a marital asset. Finally, the Trust has acknowledged in 
writing the debt owed to Petitioner. Petitioner's Ex. 50. 
4At trial Petitioner acknowledged that she did not keep contemporaneous records and that 
this exhibit is a reconstruction based on other records available to her. 
Petitioner asserts, and Respondent does not dispute, that this amount was consumed by 
the parties in meeting their marital expenses. 
6It is undisputed that the Trust documents authorized payment for compensation of 
trustees who work for the Trust. Nevertheless, through much of the pendency of this case 
Petitioner adamantly denied, under oath, that she had a compensation arrangement with the 
Trust. Instead, she asserted that her services to the Trust were in a volunteer capacity to help her 
parents. Petitioner's belated acknowledgment that she is owed compensation by the Trust did not 
occur until July 30, 2008-practically on the eve of trial. 
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1fl4 Although Petitioner and the Trust now acknowledge that she has failed to collect 
$118,699.44 in wages, Respondent contends that the amounts actually owed by the Trust for 
Petitioner's services is far in excess of that amount. In support of this contention Respondent 
offers his own exhibit - an application to Ford Motor Credit filed by Petitioner on or about July 
31, 2004. Petitioner's Ex. 28. In that application Petitioner listed her occupation as "Estate 
Manager," the "Powell Family Trust" as her employer, her monthly salary at "$3,800," and her 
time on the job as "6 years." Id. According to this exhibit, Petitioner's documented employment 
with the Trust began no later than July 1998, rather than in August 2000 as she contended at trial 
and in her exhibit 22.7 Whether or not those representations to Ford Credit were truthful, the 
Court finds that it is fair and appropriate to hold Petitioner to the certification she made in that 
credit application as an admission against interest. Therefore, the Court finds that during the term 
of the marriage Petitioner was employed by the Trust for no less than 82.3 months at a gross 
monthly wage of $3,800 per month, for total gross imputed earnings during that period of 
$312,740. 
[^15 The Court finds that although Petitioner had control of the Trust and could have paid 
herself for her services during that time, Petitioner chose to not withdraw those funds but to 
shelter them in the Trust as unrecognized income. In the meantime, she placed in the Trust assets 
that she used (and continues to use) for her personal benefit. Therefore, it is fair and appropriate 
to impute $312,740.00 in unrecognized income to Petitioner for the period July 1998-May 10, 
2005, rather than simply to accept the approximately $118,700, that she and the Trust have 
already acknowledged to be a marital asset. 
f^ 16 Petitioner offers two reasons for why she believes it would be unfair to credit Respondent 
with half of the value of her deferred income: (1) because there will be tax consequences that 
need to be recognized; and (2) because the Trust does not have sufficient liquid assets to pay 
Petitioner in a lump sum. Petitioner urges the Court to discount the debt because of the 
"risk"that she may not be able to collect the full amount from the Trust. Id. The Court finds that 
Petitioner's arguments have little merit. 
[^17 As to the tax liability issue, at trial Respondent suggested that the parties were similarly 
situated financially and that the Court could therefore treat both parties as being subject to a 33% 
7At trial Petitioner sought to distance herself from the statements in her application by 
claiming that her son had prepared and signed the Ford Credit application. Whether that belated 
assertion is true or not is irrelevant; the fact is that Petitioner acknowledged submitting the 
application to Ford Credit. Thus, if someone else prepared and/or signed the application, the 
reasonable inference is that it was done at her direction. Further, by submitting the application 
Petitioner adopted the representations therein as her own. It is undisputed that Petitioner was the 
one who received the benefit of the credit secured by that application, and that she used those 
proceeds to purchase a vehicle which she used. Petitioner has also claimed that she applied to 
Ford Credit in her capacity as trustee of the Trust, not on her own behalf. There is no indication 
on the face of the application that would support this contention. 
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tax liability. Petitioner did not challenge that suggestion or offer an alternative. Accordingly, the 
Court accepts Respondent's suggestion as a fair and appropriate way to calculate the tax liability 
on Petitioner's uncollected earnings. 
f 18 As to the "risk" of not collecting on the unpaid earnings, although Petitioner is technically 
a co-trustee of the Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggests that 
Petitioner has exercised full control over the Trust's assets and has used the Trust structure in 
whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal interest. Indeed, according to 
Petitioner's own testimony, during the same time she was deferring payments to herself from the 
Truster her services, she was paying herself and her siblings $500 per month as gifts from the 
Trust. The Court does not credit Petitioner's testimony in this regard. She has presented no 
corroborative evidence to support her claim that during the relevant time period the Trust was so 
illiquid that it could not pay her for her services. To be sure, Petitioner's exhibit 50, a letter 
dated July 28, 2008, states that the Trust presently lacks enough "liquid" assets to retire the 
admitted Trust's financial obligation to Petitioner. However, nothing in that letter addresses the 
Trust's inability during the relevant period (1998-2005) to pay the amounts it owed. Indeed, it is 
evident from the gifts paid out during that period (together with rents collected from Trust 
properties) that there were liquid assets available to the Trust at the time. It is also clear from the 
testimony at trial that the Trust presently owns a number of other assets that could be sold to 
retire that obligation.8 Moreover, that is not the only option available. Because these parties 
have considerable other assets to their name, there is always the option of offsetting the value 
Respondent's share of imputed income from the Trust against other assets of the parties. 
If 19 Respondent suggested that the Court also impute interest on Petitioner's undeclared wage 
income at a "modest" rate of 5% per year.9 Although Respondent presented no evidence in 
support of the interest rate he proposed, the Court can take judicial notice of the legal interest 
8The evidence before the Court was that in the year 2000, the Trust owned assets worth 
approximately $3.2 million. Petitioner's trial testimony to the effect that she does not know the 
worth of the Trust she controls is simply not credible. 
9At trial, Respondent's counsel made a somewhat different argument regarding wages to 
be imputed to Petitioner. The numbers suggested by Respondent's counsel in argument include 
$50,000 in a "forgiven loan," $15,084.00 in value of unaccounted "overtime pay", $10,000 in 
estimated interest, and a $108,093.30 adjustment to the hourly salary. The Court concludes that 
Respondent's counsel failed to lay proper foundation for how these numbers were derived. 
Specifically, Respondent's counsel did not explain the time periods covered by his calculations 
(i.e, beginning in 1995, 1998, or 2000), the basis for calculating interest, the basis for concluding 
that Petitioner would be covered by federal overtime pay provisions vs. being salaried 
"managemenf'personnel, etc. The Court concludes that it will simply rely on Petitioner's 
representations to Ford Credit for computing years worked and monthly salary. 
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rates for the relevant period (1998-2005).10 The yearly-set federal post-judgment interest rate 
during that period ranged from a low of 3.28% in 2004 to a high of 7.64% in 1998, and averaged 
5.5% for the entire period. Therefore, the Court accepts Respondent's suggestion that a 5% 
interest rate be used to approximate the interest income that would have resulted if Petitioner had 
timely collected her wages from the Trust. 
Valuation of the Marital Estate 
Tf20 In this case the parties have used the date of separation to calculate other matters 
involving division of assets and allocation of debt. For example, Petitioner calculated her 
acknowledged earnings from the Trust only through May 10, 2005. Similarly, Respondent's 
request that income be imputed to Petitioner only extended through May 10, 2005. Additionally, 
at |^22 of the Stipulation Agreement signed by the parties in October 2005 (the "Stipulation"), the 
parties agreed to "bear sole liability for, and hold the other party harmless from , any debts or 
liabilities incurred . . .[by them] since the[ir] separation in May, 2005, unless indicted [sic] 
otherwise in this Stipulation." 
1f2l As part of the Stipulation the parties also agreed that any wages earned after the date of 
separation would be their sole and separate property. Stipulation, at ^20. Notwithstanding that 
agreement, Petitioner now argues that this provision does not apply to accruals of pension 
benefits after that date. She, therefore, makes claim to an equitable share of Respondent's 
pension benefits through the date the Divorce Decree enters. Petitioner has offered little by way 
of support for her claim to post-separation pension benefits other than reliance on the general rule 
that assets are valued as of the time of trial or entry of the Divorce Decree. 
Premarital Property and Inheritance 
*|22 The parties have stipulated that value of premarital real estate properties held by the 
parties is essentially "a wash." Therefore, the parties did not present evidence at trial on this 
issue. The Court finds that the parties have resolved between themselves the issue of the 
premarital real estate. 
|^23 As part of their 2005 Stipulation Respondent received $21,232.56 from the sale of his 
mother's home, and $ 19,971.12 from the sale of land owned by his mother in New Mexico. The 
parties further recognized that Respondent was entitled to those funds as his separate property, 
10Each year the United States Government and the Administrative Office of the Courts for 
the State of Utah publishes the federal post-judgment interest rate for that year. For the relevant 
period (1998-2005). Of course, even though these Under Utah Code §15-1-1(2), the statutory 
pre-judgment is 10%. 
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together with all interest accrued from those funds.11 Petitioner disputes and claims a half-
interest in $14,213.17 in cash from Respondent's mother's estate. The Court heard testimony at 
trial regarding these funds and finds that those moneys came from Respondent's mother's 
account, that no marital funds were placed in mother's account, and that the transfer of funds to 
the parties' joint account was solely for purposes of distribution to Respondent's siblings as part 
of settling the mother's estate^ 
Division of Marital Assets 
Cash and Cash Equivalents 
[^24 The parties have stipulated that they presently hold, in various accounts, a total of 
$447,471.94 in marital assets. The money in these accounts should be equitably divided between 




 Although Respondent was awarded these inheritance amounts in 2005 under the terms 
of the Stipulation, he has never received those funds because Petitioner's counsel "froze" the 
accounts. It is not exactly clear to the Court why three years after the Stipulation these funds 
have not been distributed to Respondent, but the Court finds that these previously-awarded funds 
should be immediately released to Respondent. Respondent should also receive all the interest 
accrued on the funds awarded to him by Stipulation but which have been detained by actions of 
Petitioner's counsel. 
12As referenced supra, as part of their Stipulation the parties received a partial distribution 
of marital assets in cash, negotiable instruments, and personalty, valued at approximately 
$200,000 for each party. The distributions included the following: 
Petitioner Respondent 
Certificate of Deposit (CD) valued at $34,960 CD valued at $33,525.07 
5-year term deposit valued at $45,168.57 5-year term deposit valued at $45,168.57 
1/2 share in CD valued at $221,265.42 1/2 share in CD valued at $221,265.42 
1/2 share in a Cyprus CU account ($8,711.14 ea.) 1/2 share in a Cyprus CU account ($8,711.14 ea.) 
The parties also stipulated that any difference in the actual dollar value of the CDs awarded to the 
parties would be taken into account in the final settlement of the marital estate, and Respondent 
would be entitled to an offset for the difference in the amount. Stipulation, at ^3. 
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[^25 Respondent has requested that the Court impute a fair market rental value for the 
residence in the amount of $1,300 per month, and that it award him one-half of that imputed 
rental value as a marital asset. The Court finds no basis for doing so. In their Stipulation the 
parties agreed that Petitioner would be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital 
residence during the pendency of the action. Although in their Stipulation Petitioner expressly 
disclaimed any claim for spousal support and/or alimony during the pendency of this action, the 
Court construes the provision granting Petitioner the right to use and possess the residence as a 
form of negotiated "in-kind" spousal support. The Court also finds no merit to Respondent's 
alternative suggestion that the Court consider the expenditures he incurred in securing separate 
housing for during the pendency of the action. Because of the protective order that issued as a 
result of the DV incident in May 2005, Respondent was not allowed to remain in the residence. 
That protective order remains in place and, as a result, whether or not these parties were 
divorcing, Respondent would have incurred a separate housing expense. 
}^26 At Petitioner's request, the marital residence was appraised in June, 2008, and valued at 
$ 186,000. Petitioner has asked that the marital residence be awarded to her with credit to 
Respondent for his interest in the residence. However, Petitioner argues that the Court should 
adjust downward the residence's value to account for a "mold problem" in the residence and the 
cost of remedying the alleged problem. 
[^27 The appraiser, Mr. Mulcock, testified that he was asked to consider the cost to remedy the 
mold problem after he rendered his appraisal. Mr. Mulcock testified that he would amend his 
appraisal downward by $5,000.00 to account for that problem. The Court accepts Mr. Mulcock's 
testimony and finds that the residence should be valued at $181,000.00. The Court finds this is a 
marital asset and Respondent is entitled to his equitable share of that value. 
Personalty 
Vehicles and Boat 
[^28 Based on the Stipulation the parties divided between themselves various items of 
personalty including a SeaRay boat, which was awarded to Petitioner and valued at $14,900. 
Respondent was awarded two older Ford trucks (one brown, one red) and a red truck topper. The 
parties agreed that value on those vehicles would be assessed according to Kelly Blue Book value 
as of May 2005. Stipulation at 1fijl0,l 1. Respondent was also awarded the parties' 1992 
Northland Camper, at an assessed value of $2,000.00, with the proviso that "Petitioner [would 
be] entitled to a $2,000.00 offset in the final division of the marital estate." Id., at ^[11. The 
parties also stipulated that the difference between the value of the boat and the value of the two 
trucks and the topper would be taken into account in the final division of the marital estate. Id., 
atlfH. 
[^29 Respondent presented evidence at trial that the Kelly Blue Book "private party" value for 
the Ford trucks was $3,150 for the Brown Ford truck and $4,350 for the Red Ford truck. 
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Petitioner did not contest those figures and the Court accepts them as fair representation of the 
value of those vehicles. Neither side presented evidence on the value of the red "topper" for one 
of the trucks, so the Court assumes no additional value attributable to it. 
f30 After subtracting the value of the two Ford trucks awarded to Respondent in October 
2005, from the $14,900 value of the SeaRay boat awarded to Petitioner at that time, the Court 
finds that there is a difference of $7,400 in favor of Respondent. Pursuant to [^11 of the 
Stipulation, Petitioner is entitled to a $2,000 offset because of the Northland Camper awarded to 
Respondent. After subtracting Petitioner's offset, the Court finds that Respondent is entitled to a 
net credit of $5,400 for these items of previously-distributed personalty. 
1f31 Respondent has asked the Court to include within the marital estate the value of two 
vehicles (a 2003 Ford Taurus and a 2004 Ford F-150 truck) purchased with funds from the Trust. 
In support of his position Respondent argues that these vehicles were "additional compensation" 
for Petitioner's services to the Trust and were intended to be marital property. The evidence at 
trial established that the money to purchase these vehicles came from the Trust, but that the 
vehicles were initially registered in Petitioner's name. Thereafter, on or about November 23, 
2005, Petitioner requested that the Division of Motor Vehicles issue a "corrected" Utah 
certificate of title for the two vehicles to reflect ownership by Petitioner as trustee of the Trust. 
The vehicles were insured under the parties' homeowner's policy, but Petitioner testified 
(without challenge by Respondent) that the cost of the insurance was paid by the Trust. 
Tf32 Based on the evidence presented the Court finds that while the parties benefitted from the 
use of these vehicles for a period of time, the 2003 Taurus and the 2004 Ford F-150 should 
properly be considered as part of the Trust estate which paid to purchase and insure them. 
Dogs 
f33 The parties own four dogs, each valued at approximately $800. Petitioner has retained 
possession of the dogs. Therefore, it is fair and appropriate that Respondent receive an offsetting 
credit in the amount of $3,200. 
Coin Collection and Silver Granules 
P 4 The parties acknowledge that Respondent had a coin collection that predated their 
marriage. There is also agreement that in July 2003, Respondent paid Petitioner's mother 
approximately $8,840 for some coins. That payment was made with a check from an account 
bearing the names of both parties. Petitioner has alleged that Respondent took the coin collection 
with him when the parties separated and has since hidden or otherwise disposed of the coins in 
order to make them unavailable to her. Respondent denies Petitioner's claim. 
f35 At trial Respondent was asked directly where the coins were located. Because of 
Respondent's concern that the items would "disappear" if he disclosed their location in open 
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court, arrangements were made to have a representative of the Taylorsville Police Department 
search the location identified by Respondent. The location turned out to be at the residence that 
has been occupied by Petitioner since the May 2005 incident. The police officer was 
accompanied by the parties' attorneys. The police officer who conducted the search reported to 
the Court that none of the items sought had been found. 
[^36 Although the Court could reasonably infer from what transpired at trial that Respondent is 
not in possession of these items, the Court has insufficient evidence to render a specific Finding 
on this issue. In short, the Court cannot find that one or the other of the parties is more likely 
than not to have these items within his/her possession. Accordingly the Court declines to credit 
the value of these items against either of the parties' share of the marital estate. However, if at a 
later date there is evidence presented that one of the parties indeed has maintained control or 
disposed of these items, it would be appropriate for the aggrieved party to seek sanctions under 
an Order to Show Cause. 
Tf37 In the Stipulation Respondent acknowledged that "he has sole control" over several 
packets of silver ore (the "granules"). Stipulation, at J^16. Petitioner alleged that this ore is the 
property of Petitioner's mother; Respondent claimed it had been a gift to him from Petitioner's 
mother after it was determined that the ore did not contain gold. Petitioner bears the burden of 
proof and, presumably, she could have had her mother testify about this issue. The fact that she 
chose not to present the most persuasive and direct evidence available (her mother's testimony), 
suggests to the Court that her mother's testimony would not have supported her contention. 
Given that the Court has already determined that Petitioner's uncorroborated testimony is not 
credible, the benefit of the doubt goes to Respondent. 
Home Furnishings 
TJ38 Respondent alleges that Petitioner retained most of the home furnishings after he was 
escorted out of the home on May 2005. He requests that the Court award him a gun cabinet and 
pool table, both of which are presently in Petitioner's possession, and another $2,000 to balance 
out the value of the furnishings retained by Petitioner. Petitioner did not object to or comment on 
this request by Respondent. The Court therefore awards the requested items and the $2,000 
offset to Respondent.13 
Operating Engineers Pension Account and IRAs 
|^39 Petitioner maintains that the "marital estate commenced to be accumulated beginning 
13At the time the Court orally announced its Findings to the parties and counsel, on 
Petitioner's behalf her counsel requested that Respondent be required to arrange for a bonded and 
insured mover to pick up and transport the pool table and gun cabinet from Petitioner's 




May 1982." Petitioner's Trial Brief, at 1-2. Petitioner asks to be awarded one half of 
Respondent's retirement pension account with the Operating Engineers Trust Fund for the period 
of May 1982 through the date the Divorce Decree enters. Respondent argues that the moneys 
accumulated in his pension account premaritally, i.e., before May 1984, should be deemed his 
separate property, and that the Court should divide the marital estate as of the date of separation. 
The Court disagrees with Petitioner's argument and finds that Respondent's pension accruals 
prior to the date of marriage should be considered his separate pre-marital property. The Court 
also finds that the provisions in the parties' Stipulation regarding the separation of their financial 
interests (wages, debts, etc) applies to Respondent's pension account. Petitioner's claim to an 
equitable share of Respondent's pension benefits also terminates as of May 10, 2005. 
f40 The value of an IRAs established premaritally by the parties should be considered 
separate property. To the extent, if at all, that contributions were made to pre-existing or newly 
established IRAs between the parties' marriage and separation, those amounts should be 
considered marital assets and equitably divided between the parties. 
Miscellaneous Matters 
Taxes Paid on Interest 
Tf41 During tax years 2005 and 2006 Respondent declared and paid taxes on the funds he 
withdrew from the parties' joint accounts. Additional interest has accumulated for tax years 
2007 and 2008, although it is not clear whether Respondent actually paid taxes on the 2007 
interest, and the 2008 tax year has not yet closed. Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner 
should receive one-half of the interest that has accrued on these funds between 2005 and now, 
but wants Petitioner to pay one half of the taxes he has paid on the accrued interest. The Court 
finds that Respondent acted intentionally and wrongfully in emptying out the marital accounts 
immediately upon the parties' separation, and in transferring those funds to accounts solely 
within his control. Although Respondent has testified-without challenge by Petitioner-that he 
has returned to the marital estate $20,908.27 of what he had previously withdrawn, the Court 
finds that it would be inequitable to allow these actions by Respondent to go unsanctioned. 
Thus, while the Court agrees that Petitioner is entitled to one-half of the interest that has accrued 
on the marital funds under Respondent's control, the Court finds it is fair and appropriate that 
Respondent alone bear the tax consequences of the marital funds he has had under his control. 
Cash value of Petitioner's Life Insurance 
[^42 The parties have stipulated that Petitioner's life insurance has a cash value of $13,045.00 
and that it is a marital asset. Respondent should be awarded one half of that cash value. 
Respondent's Payments on Behalf of Petitioner and/or Her Son 
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TJ43 Petitioner has not contested Respondent's request that he be given credit for the moneys 
he loaned Petitioner's son. Petitioner also acknowledges that Respondent made various 
payments on her behalf and that he should receive an offset for those payments prior to dividing 
the marital estate. 
Recoupment for Respondent's Personalty Sold by Petitioner 
}^44 Petitioner has admitted selling ammunition and ammo reloading equipment belonging to 
Respondent for "$36 and a dinner." Respondent has estimated that it will cost $2,500 to replace 
all the equipment which he maintains Petitioner sold.14 However, Respondent has provided no 
support for his cost estimate. For example, there was no indication that Respondent's estimate 
accounts for depreciation due to age of the equipment, "wear and tear," and whether some of it 
may have become obsolete technology in the interim period. The Court has directed 
Respondent's counsel to provide documentation supporting his client's claim. The Court finds 
that in disposing of Respondent's equipment for a "fire sale" price Petitioner acted wrongfully, 
and therefore she should be held liable for reimbursing Respondent for any documented value 
that Respondent is able to provide in support of his estimated replacement cost. 
Azite Mine Investment (aka Custom Milling and Grinding) 
[^45 Per the terms of the parties' Stipulation, they will each be allocated a 50% interest in that 
investment, subject to each bearing one half the costs, including attorneys fees, associated with 
the venture. 
Protective Order 
[^46 Petitioner desires to have the protective order issued in 2005 made permanent; 
Respondent wants to have it lifted so that he may recover certain weapons that have been held in 
police custody since the May 2005 incident. Respondent argues that the parties have had no 
direct dealings with each other since that time and there is no reason to maintain the order. 
Based on the history of these parties the Court is persuaded that it is appropriate to maintain 
some form of decorum order to govern the parties' direct and indirect dealings with each other. 
However, the Court has been presented with no persuasive argument for why the existing and 
one-sided protective order should be maintained in its present form. The Court finds that it is 
fair and appropriate that the existing protective order terminate and be replaced with a mutual 
restraining order that prohibits both parties from engaging in harassing behavior or referencing 
the other-directly or indirectly—in a demeaning or derogatory manner 
14Respondent claims that Petitioner also disposed of his binoculars and of some camping 
equipment. Petitioner denies the claim. Because of Petitioner's general lack of credibility and 
the fact that, for the most part, Petitioner has maintained control over all personalty at the 
residence since Respondent was removed in May 2005, the Court is inclined to resolve these 
disputed issues in favor of Respondent. 
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Attorney's Fee Requests 
[^47 Both parties have asked the Court to award attorney's fees in this action. As represented 
in the affidavit for fees and expenses submitted by Petitioner's counsel, Petitioner has incurred a 
total of $140,499.59 in fees including $122,294.50 in attorney's fees, $11,093.25 in accounting 
services, and lesser amounts in other services. The affidavit filed by Respondent's counsel 
reflects $137,495.05 in fees and services, of which $130,130.50 is for attorney's fees. At the 
time the Commissioner certified this matter for trial he commented that "each party has caused 
the other party to incur some unnecessary fees." The Commissioner noted, however, that "there 
may be a difference in extent and this may be a reason for some modest adjustment by way of 
attorney's fees." Minutes for Pretrial Conference, November 28, 2007. 
f48 In reviewing the history of this case as reflected in the Court's file and case docket, of 
which the Court takes judicial notice, it is apparent that in this highly contested case the parties 
have brought number of motions including at least one set of cross motions to compel discovery. 
See, e.g., Respondent's Motion and Memorandum to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions and to 
Extend Discovery, filed 5-26-06; Petitioner's Motion to Compel, filed 6-16-06. The matters were 
heard by the Commissioner on 6-21-08 and Respondent prevailed on that motion. The issue of 
attorney's fees was reserved for later determination. Petitioner objected to the Commissioner's 
recommendation, prompting additional briefing to this Court. The Court affirmed the 
Commissioner's recommendation. 
Tf49 Thereafter, on 7-6-06, Petitioner brought motions to quash Subpoenas deuces Tecum and 
for a Protective Order, again seeking to shield herself from legitimate discovery by Respondent. 
Respondent had to incur fees opposing those motions. At a hearing on 7-25-06, the 
Commissioner denied both of the Petitioner's motions. Petitioner again objected to the 
Commissioner's recommendation, requiring further briefing in response by Respondent's 
counsel. After careful review, this Court again affirmed the Commissioner's Recommendation 
by Minute Entry Ruling on 10-24-06. 
[^50 An Order to Show Cause for failure to return personal property to Respondent (including 
his mother's personal papers) was certified against Petitioner on 11-06-06, with attorney's fees 
issues reserved for trial. At the same hearing the Commissioner ordered that a third party 
accompany the parties in a "walk through" of the residence to inspect for documents and other 
property of Respondent or his mother's could be found there. At trial, Respondent continued to 
assert that some items of his personal property had still not been produced, but there was no 
evidence presented specifically regarding his mother's personal papers. Therefore the Court 
infers that the parties' "walk-through" resolved this issue. 
Tf51 On or about 2-2-07, Respondent filed a number of motions and supporting memoranda 
seeking to quash subpoenas deuces tecum issued by Petitioner and directed to third parties. Later 
that same month and pursuant to an agreement with Petitioner, Respondent withdrew his various 
motions, but not before Petitioner had to respond to at least some of those motions. 
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|^52 Yet another motion to compel was filed on or about 7-30-07, this time by Petitioner, who 
was seeking Respondent's financial records. Petitioner alleged she needed the discovery to 
support her renewed claim for alimony. At a hearing held 8-20-07, the Commissioner 
determined and recommended that Petitioner's motion to compel be denied because Petitioner 
had used her waiver of alimony as a shield in the discovery process. 
[^53 Petitioner objected to the Commissioner's Recommendation. On 9-11-07, after 
reviewing the parties' briefing on that issue, the Court affirmed the Commissioner's 
Recommendation and overruled Petitioner's objection. The Court made it clear in its ruling that 
"[petitioner's] opportunity to conduct further discovery regarding Respondent's finances for 
purposes of alimony has now closed." Minute Entry of 9-11-07. 
<[|54 On 9-28-07, Petitioner then sought to have the Trust she controls as co- trustee intervene 
in the case. Again, briefing by Respondent was necessary to oppose that motion. The 
Commissioner recommended that the motion to intervene be denied, and reserved for later 
determination Respondent's request for attorney's fees incurred by him in opposing the motion to 
intervene.15 This Court agreed with and affirmed the Commissioner's Recommendation.16 
[^55 In making their respective requests for attorney's fees, neither party has specified the 
bases for their requested fees. Fees could be sought under Utah Code §30-3-3(1) or (2), or under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37 as a discovery sanction, and under the Court's contempt powers as a contempt 
sanction. 
Tf56 At trial neither party expressly addressed his or her need for assistance with attorney's 
fees, nor the other party's financial ability to assist with those fees. Both counsel's affidavits 
recite that they believe the fees charged are reasonable for the local market and necessarily 
incurred in prosecuting their client's cases. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
J^57 Jurisdictional requirements for entering a Divorce Decree are met in this case 
15At that same hearing the Commissioner recommended that Respondent's motion to 
quash a subpoena deuces tecum issued to Utah Community Credit Union be denied. He also 
denied Petitioner's request for attorney's fees on the motion to quash. 
16The Court notes this was the second attempt to intervene in this case by individuals or 
entities related to Petitioner. The first time was in September 2006 when Helen Powell 
(Petitioner's mother and co-trustee of the Trust) sought to intervene in the case. That request was 
denied by the Commissioner. The Commissioner's Recommendation of denial was affirmed by 
this Court by Minute Entry in October 2006. 
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[^58 Petitioner repeatedly and validly waived her claim to alimony. 
[^59 A Divorce Decree should enter in this case on the ground of "irreconcilable differences" 
as pled in the Complaint. 
[^60 For the reasons given in the Findings of Fact, there should be income imputed to 
Petitioner from the Trust in the amount of $312,740. Interest on this amount should be 
calculated at an annual rate of 5% (simple interest). Respondent is entitled to his equitable share 
of that amount as reflected in offsets and credits for the benefit of Respondent, to be taken 
against the parties' other assets. 
%6l The Respondent should take his mother's inheritance (including moneys from her bank 
account) free and clear of claims by Petitioner. Those funds are awarded to Respondent as his 
separate property, together with all interest accrued. 
1f62 The general rule is that the marital estate is valued as of the time of the divorce decree or 
trial. However, the Court has discretion to select a different date for valuing the estate if justice 
so requires. Because these parties have generally ordered their financial arrangements vis a vis 
the other as of the date of separation, the Court concludes that it is fair and appropriate to value 
the marital property as of that date. The only exception to this is the valuation of the marital 
residence, which Petitioner had appraised as of June 2008, and which Respondent accepted and 
adopted as an appropriate valuation date. 
[^63 The Court values the marital residence at $181,000 and the Divorce Decree will include 
an award to Respondent for one half that value. 
f 64 Based on the Findings herein, the Divorce Decree will implement the various offsets 
noted. 
TJ65 The 2003 Taurus and the 2004 Ford F-150 are the property of the Trust, and not marital 
property. 
f66 Respondent's holds a pre-marital interest in the Operating Engineers Pension account. 
The contributions to that account from the time the parties married until they separated are 
marital property. Contributions to that account after the parties' separation are Respondent's sole 
and separate property. 
f67 It is appropriate that a mutual restraining order enter as part of the Divorce Decree; the 
existing protective order will terminate. 
[^68 Neither party has made the required showing of need and of the other party's ability to 
pay in support of their respective requests for attorneys fees under Utah Code §30-3-3 and Utah 
R. Civ. P. 102. However, Respondent has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
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he had to bring, and prevailed in, Orders to Show Cause because of Petitioner's failure to comply 
with discovery. The Commissioner had reserved the issue of attorneys fees for those OSCs and 
the Court concludes that having prevailed substantively in those proceedings, it is appropriate 
that Respondent recover the reasonable attorneys fees incurred in bringing and defending those 
proceedings. See supra Findings, 1148, 50 Additionally, Respondent had to defend a motion to 
compel brought by Petitioner on or about 7-30-07. The Court awards Respondent his reasonable 
attorneys fees in connection with defending against that motion pursuant to its authority under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37. Findings at 1152-53. 
169 The Court also awards attorneys fees to Respondent for defending the second motion to 
intervene in this case. Findings at ^54. 
170 The Court awards any attorneys fees that Respondent may have incurred in his efforts to 
secure the inheritance funds awarded to him as part of the October 2005 Stipulation but which 
have been "frozen" by, or on behalf of, Petitioner. See note 11, supra 
171 Under Utah R. Civ. P. 37, the Court awards to Petitioner her attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with defending against Respondent's motions to quash various subpoenas deuces 
tecum brought on or about February 2007. Findings, at *|51. 
172 Except as otherwise provided herein, no other attorneys fees are to be awarded. 
173 The attorney's fee affidavits that have been submitted do not specify the amounts spent to 
address the issues for which attorneys fees have been specifically authorized. Counsel will need 
to submit those affidavits for the Court's review to establish the reasonableness of the attorneys 
fees expended as noted herein at ^ 68 through 71 inclusive. 
ORDER 
174 Respondent's counsel is directed promptly to prepare and file a Decree of Divorce that 
conforms with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
175 Counsel are directed to provide to the Court within ten (10) days of these Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, specific affidavits focused only on the items addressed at H 68 through 
71 inclusive. 
Entered this 10th day of October, 2008. By the Court: ,<&******. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RITA Y. RICHINS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES E. RICHINS, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No.: 054902600 
Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
Commissioner: 
In the above-captioned matter, a bench trial was held in this case on August 4th, and 
August 5th, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Mary Paxman McGee. 
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Tom D Branch. The Court heard 
testimony and received exhibits offered by both parties, and took the matter under advisement. 
After review of the testimony and exhibits the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order dated October 15, 2008. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
are incorporated herein together with the Minute Entry clarifying said Findings dated March 6, 
2009, and based thereon, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, now decrees the 
following: 
Decree of Divorcp (fis \ 
0549026O0 RICHINS, J AMES E pages: 21 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
THAT: 
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND GROUNDS 
1. Petitioner and Respondent are actual and bona fide residents' of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and have been so for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married in Salt 
Lake County on May 26, 1984, in the State of Utah. The parties separated on May 10, 2005. 
3. During the course of the marriage, there have arisen differences in the party's 
lifestyles, beliefs and attitudes toward each other such that they have been unable to reconcile 
those beliefs and attitudes so as to remain living together as husband and wife. As a result of the 
foregoing irreconcilable differences, the marriage is irretrievably broken, making it impossible 
for the marriage to continue and the Court grants Petitioner a Decree of Divorce dissolving the 
bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, the same to become final upon 
entry, upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO ALIMONY 
4. The Court ruled prior to trial on more than one occasion that Petitioner had 
repeatedly and validly waived her alimony claim. Nevertheless, at trial, Petitioner sought to 
again proffer grounds in support of a renewed claim for alimony. Petitioner has provided no 
facts that would justify a change to the Court's prior rulings, which are incorporated herein, and 
as set forth in the Court's Findings. No material facts have changed since the last time the Court 
addressed this issue, therefore, Petitioner's claim for alimony has been waived, and there are not 
2 
sufficient facts presented to justify any claim for same, and therefore no alimony is awarded. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSESTS 
5. The parties stipulated to cash and cash equivalent amounts at the time of 
trial of $447,471.94 held in various accounts in their respective names as itemized below: 
ACCOUNTS IN PETITIONER'S NAME 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ACCOUNT # BALANCE AT TRIAL 
Salt Lake Credit Union Checking 53240 
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares 53240 
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt 53240 
Salt Lake Credit Union CD 53240 
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA 53240 
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA 53240 
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA 53240 
Operating Engineers CU Checking 226042 
Operating Engineers CU Savings 226042 
Operating Engineers CU IRA 226042 












FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ACCOUNT # BALANCE AT TRIAL 
America First Savings 
America First Certificate 
State Farm Bank Savings 
State Farm Bank IRA 
State Farm Bank IRA 
State Farm Bank IRA 
Cyprus Credit Union Reg. Shares 
Cyprus Credit Union Money Market 
Cyprus Credit Union Certificate 
Cyprus Credit Union Certificate 
Mountain America CU Savings 
Mountain America CU Money Mrkt 
Mountain America CU Certificate 
Operating Engineers CU Money Mrk 
Operating Engineers CU Checking 
Operating Engineers CU IRA 
Operating Engineers CU Certificate 
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares 
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt 









































407,370.07 Respondent's Total 
40,101.87 Petitioner's Total 
447,471.94 TOTAL 
19 OS 
6. However, the Court concludes pursuant to its Findings that it is fair and 
appropriate to value the marital estate as of the date of separation, May 10, 2005. Therefore, the 
combined cash and cash equivalent of the accounts at separation are as itemized below: 
ACCOUNTS IN PETITIONER'S NAME AS OF DATE OF SEPARATION: 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
Salt Lake Credit Union Checking 
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares 
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt 
Salt Lake Credit Union CD 
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA 
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA 
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA 
Operating Engineers CU Checking 
Operating Engineers CU Savings 
Operating Engineers CU IRA 






















48,438.02 Petitioner's total 
ACCOUNTS IN RESPONDENT'S NAME AS OF DATE OF SEPARATION: 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
America First Savings 
America First Certificate 
Vanguard IRA 
Vanguard IRA, Roth 
Cyprus Credit Union Reg. Shares 
Cyprus Credit Union Certificate 
Cyprus Credit Union 
Mountain America CU Savings 
Mountain America CU Money Mrkt 
Mountain America CU Certificate 
Mountain America CU 
Operating Engineers CU 
Operating Engineers CU 
Operating Engineers CU 
Operating Engineers CU 
Operating Engineers CU 
Operating Engineers CU 
Operating Engineers CU 
Operating Engineers CU IRA 
Operating Engineers CU IRA, Roth 
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares 
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt 









































405.719.50 Respondent's total 
4 
$ 454,157.52 TOTAL OF ACCOUNTS 
7. The parties entered into a Stipulation concerning the partial distribution of marital 
assets on or about October 14, 2005. The terms of the stipulation were reduced to writing and 
entered as a Temporary Order by this Court on October 27, 2005. Each party received 
approximately $200,000 from that division. The Court incorporates that Order herein. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO PETITIONER'S WAGES FROM 
POWELL FAMILY TRUST 
8. Petitioner was employed by the Trust for no less than 82.3 months at a gross 
monthly wage of $3,800 per month, for a total gross imputed earnings of $312,740. The Court 
imputes income to Petitioner for the time period set forth in the Findings of $312,740 together 
with interest at 5% per annum, and deducts taxes at 33% per annum. The amount awarded to 
Respondent is one half of Petitioner's net income from the trust to be paid directly or as an offset 
from the equitable division of the parties' cash equivalents or assets. Respondent's one-half share 
is $134,364.75. (See accounting of "Petitioner's Wages from Trust", Exhibit "A".) 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CASH VALUE OF LIFE INSURANCE 
9. Petitioner has a Life insurance policy with a cash value of $13,045 and 
Respondent is entitled to one-half of the value, or $6,522.50, to be paid directly or as an offset 
from the equitable division of the parties' cash equivalents or assets. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE MARITAL HOME 
10. The martial home is valued at $ 181,000 and Respondent shall be entitled to one 
half of the value of the home in the amount of $90,500.00 to be paid directly or as offset from the 
equitable division of the parties1 cash and cash equivalents or other assets. 
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PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAXES PAID ON INTEREST 
11. Respondent shall be solely liable for all taxes he paid from interest on the funds 
he withdrew from the parties' joint accounts for the tax years 2005 through 2008. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO CD FUNDS PREVIOUSLY DIVIDED 
12. Based on the October 2005 Order, two (2) certificates of deposit were divided. 
The Petitioner received a CD, valued at $34,960 and Respondent received a CD valued at 
$33,525.07. The Respondent is awarded the difference between the two (2) certificates of 
deposits in the amount of $1,434.93, to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of 
the parties1 cash and cash equivalents or other assets. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO CASH ACCOUNTS, CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSITS, 
VEHICLES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 
13. The Respondent is entitled to a net credit of $5,400, which represents the 
difference in the values of the vehicles of previously-distributed property, and is to be paid 
directly or offset from the equitable division of the partiesf cash and cash equivalents or other 
assets. 
14. The additional items of personal property not already in Respondent's possession 
that shall be granted to the Respondent shall be the gun cabinet and the pool table along with an 
additional $2,000 to balance out the value of the furnishings retained by Petitioner. $2,000 shall 
be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of the parties' cash and cash equivalents or 
other assets. Because of the cost and inconvenience to move the gun cabinet and pool table, the 
Respondent voluntarily forgives his right to said items and they are hereby awarded to Petitioner. 
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15. Respondent shall also be awarded an amount equal to the estimated value of the 
personal belongings Petitioner sold or otherwise disposed of by Petitioner. Respondent has 
supplied a current estimate to replace the stated items in the amount of $1,453.70 but the Court 
feels the submission does not make any adjustment to account for age and condition of the terms, 
nor improvements in technology. To compensate for those considerations, the Court award 
judgment in favor of Respondent in the amount of $1,200.00 and that amount is awarded to 
Respondent and is to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of the parties' cash and 
cash equivalents or other assets. 
16. The Respondent shall be granted as non-marital property any and all granules or 
packets of silver ore. 
17. Both parties shall be allocated a 50% interest in the investment of the Azite 
Mine (aka Custom Milling and Grinding) and both parties' shall share one-half of the costs, 
including attorneys fees, associated with the venture. 
18. The Respondent is awarded the amount of $3,200 for the value of the parties' 
dogs to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of the parties' cash and cash 
equivalents or other assets. 
19. The Respondent is awarded $3,600 as an offset to the amount of monies 
"loaned" to Petitioner's son, Erin Kowal, to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division 
of the parties' cash and cash equivalents or other assets. 
20. The Respondent is awarded as non-marital funds the amount of $55,416.85, 
which represents the total amount of Respondent's inheritance fiinds held at Cyprus Credit Union 
7 
that were "frozen" by Petitioner's counsel, and previously ordered to be released, together with 
interest accrued on the funds in the amount of $349.14. 
21. Petitioner shall within 30 days notify all financial institutions to release all 
funds held in Respondent's name and social security number as listed herein: 
Salt Lake City Credit Union 
Operating Engineers Credit Union 
America First Credit Union 
Mountain America Credit Union 
State Farm Bank 
Failure on the part of Petitioner to comply with this Order shall subject her to the full panoply of 
Court Sanctions, including contempt. 
22. After separation Respondent paid Petitioner's personal bills in the amount of 
$7,737.00 from Respondent's post separation wages (personal non-marital funds), therefore 
Respondent is awarded twice that amount, or $15,474.00, to be paid directly or offset from the 
equitable division of the parties' cash and cash equivalents or other assets. 
PROTECTIVE ORDER DISMISSAL 
23. The Court hereby immediately terminates, dismisses and dissolves the 
Protective Order against Respondent and Orders that he receive all his guns and other property 
being held by the Bureau of Crimes Investigation in Taylorsville. This Decree is an Order to 
release said property to Respondent immediately. Respondent is awarded all personal property 
currently in his possession, his guns and all other property set forth in this Decree. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO DEBTS, OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES 
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24. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 15-4-6.5 the parties shall provide to their appropriate 
creditors notice pursuant to said statute by service of a copy of the Decree of Divorce that the 
parties are divorced and further advise said creditors of their separate and current address to take 
advantage of said statute that no report of the debtor's repayment practices or credit history may 
be made regarding the joint obligation after the creditors have notice of the Court's order unless 
the creditor has made a demand on the debtor for payment because of failure to make payments 
by the other debtor who is ordered by the Court to make the payments. The parties shall inform 
any creditors (of a joint obligation) of the allocation of responsibility for payment herein and to 
keep any such creditors informed of their current addresses for purposes of notification. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
25. The Court finds that Respondent's pension accruals prior to the date of the 
parties' marriage shall be his separate pre-marital property. The Court orders that the pension 
account be divided as of the date of separation, May 10, 2005. Petitioner shall have claim to a 
spouses share of Respondent's pension benefits from the date of their marriage (May 26, 1984) 
to the date of separation (May 10, 2005). Contributions and interest accumulations to that 
account before marriage and after the parties' separation are Respondent's sole and separate 
property. The parties are to cooperate fully in drafting a Qualified Domestic Relation's Order 
(QDRO) consistent with this Decree, and Petitioner is responsible to complete the QDRO with 
mutual agreement of the parties. 
INTEREST ON FUNDS AND IRA ACCOUNTS 
26. The value of any IRA's established premarital by the parties shall be 
considered separate property. (The Respondent accrued pre-marital an IRA that with interest to 
9 
date of separation amounts to $23,891, See Accounting of Interest of IRA, Exhibit "B") To the 
extent, if at all, that new contributions were made to pre-existing or newly established IRA's 
between the parties' marriage and separation, those amounts shall be considered marital assets 
and equitably divided between the parties. 
PROVISIONS FOR AWARDS OF THE MARITAL ACCOUNTS 
27. Some of the cash accounts held by the parties as itemized in paragraph 6 of 
this Decree, are traditional IRA pre-tax accounts. The court finds that a tax should be applied to 
these amounts of 33% to properly allow for the present value of said accounts as follows: 
Total of ERA accounts for Petitioner: 35,301.74 
Amount of tax paid on IRA's @ 33% -11,649.57 
$23,652.17 
Total of ERA accounts for Respondent 122,602.50 
Less pre-marital ERA -23,891.12 
98,711.38 
Amount of tax paid on ERA's @ 33% -32,574.75 
$ 66,136.63 
28. Based on the awards set forth herein, the Court approves the below as a summary 
of the division of assets: 
PETITIONER RESPONDENT 
48,438.02 (cash at separation) 405,719.50 (cash at separation) 
268,729.51 Rita's income from Trust (see exhibit A) < 55,416.85> see paragraph 20 of Decree 
<349.14> see paragraph 20 of Decree 
13,045.00 Life Insurance value <23,891.12> see paragraph 26 ofDecree 
181,000.00 marital home 
CD's division <1,434.93> see paragraph 12 ofDecree 
Vehicle division <5,400.00> see paragraph 13 ofDecree 
Rita's bills paid by Jim <15,470.00> see paragraph 22 ofDecree 
Personal Property <2,000.00> see paragraph 14 ofDecree 
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Jim's personal property sold <15200.00> see paragraph 15 of Decree 
Dogs <3,200.0O> see paragraph 18 of Decree 
Loan to son <3,600.0O> see paragraph 19 of Decree 
$511,212.52 $ 293,757.46 
-11,649.57 for 33% tax on IRA's (see paragraph 27 of decree) -32,574.75 for 33% tax on IRA's 
499,562.95 261,182.71 
29. The total of the parties' estate and accounts is $760,745.66. When divided by 
one-half it equals $380,372.83 which is the amount awarded to each party. Once the amounts 
currently under the control of each party are considered, the Petitioner owes the Respondent 
$119,190.12 before any award of attorney fees. 
30. In order to compensate the Respondent for the amount due him as set forth in 
the preceding paragraph and the amount of attorney fees awarded him in paragraph 32 hereafter, 
the Petitioner is ordered to take immediate actions to liquidate or transfer any and all assets she 
has or that are awarded to her herein to pay Respondent. Petitioner is ordered to pay Respondent 
the full amounts awarded to him in this Decree within 15 days of its entry, and if she is unable to 
do so then a judgment shall automatically enter for any balance not paid on that date, together 
with Judgment and interest per law. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO RESTRAINT 
31. Both the Respondent and the Petitioner are mutually restrained from engaging 
in harassing behavior towards the other, including treatment of the other in a demeaning or 
derogatory manner, directly or indirectly. Both parties are mutually restrained from contacting 
either party at their place of residence, employment or any other location and by any 
communication device. Both parties are restrained from initiating or participating in any 
communication or actions that would cause harm or threaten to harm to the other party. 
11 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
32. The Court awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to paragraphs 68 through 
71 of the Findings and pursuant to the Minute Entry dated March 6, 2009. The Respondent's 
counsel has prepared and filed a more detailed Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Costs as directed 
by the court. Respondent is awarded the amount of $ 45,954.00, to be added to the amount of 
debt set forth in paragraph 29 herein. This award of fees is given under Utah Code Sec. 30-3-3 
(1) or (2), or under Utah R. Civ. P. 37 as a discovery sanction, and under the Court's contempt 
powers as a contempt sanction. 
OTHER 
33. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other party without cost, 
any documents necessary to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the 
Court. 
SEPARATE PROPERTY 
34. Unless otherwise provided herein, all property and money received or retained 
by each party pursuant not addressed in this Decree of Divorce shall be the separate property of 
such party, free and clear of any right, interest or claim of the other party, and each party shall 
hereafter own, have and enjoy, independently of any claim or right of the other party, all items of 
real and personal property now or hereafter belonging to her or him, and each party shall have 
the right to deal with or dispose of her or his separate property, both real and personal, fully and 
effectively, in all respects and for all purposes. 
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WHEREFORE, The Court hereby enters and orders a Decree of Divorce pursuant to 
the terms set forth herein. 
j DATED this H day of j ^ , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
THIRD JUDICIAL D, 




I hereby certify that I sent via e-mail and regular mail, a copy of the foregoing DECREE 
lid, this W d OF DIVORCE to the following, postage prepai , ay of April, 2009: 
MARY PAXMAN MCGEE 
1855E.BROOKHILLDR. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 
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EXHIBIT "A 
1 9 ; 
TOM D BRANCH LLC 
TOM D BRANCH (3997) 
Attorney for Respondent 
1350 East Draper Parkway 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone (801) 553-1500 
Fax(801)553-1550 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RITA Y. RICHINS, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY TATUM 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 05490-2600 
JAMES E. RICHINS, ) 
) Judge: DENISE LINDBERG 
Respondent. ) Comrn: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Larry Tatum, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. If called to testify my testimony would be as set forth herein. 
2. I have a degree in Accounting from Utah State University, and I've been in the 
accounting profession for 40 years. 
3. I am a Senior Tax Accountant for Larson & Rosenberger, LLP, located at 9065 
South 1300 East in Sandy, Utah 84094. 
4. Based on the Court finding the Petitioner had a gross monthly income of 
$3,800.00 per month from the July 1, 1998 through May 10, 2005, for a total amount of 
82.3 months; considering the income tax at a rate of 33%; and calculating simple interest 
of 5% per year; I have calculated the amount due Petitioner. 
5. For the first year (1998), the Petitioner would have gross income of $22,800 
over six months, coming in at the rate of $3,800 gross per month from July through 
December. The total net income with interest at 1.25% (reflecting 5% as reduced to take 
into consideration the part year monthly income) for 1998 is therefore $15,466.95. 
6. For the year 1999, the Petitioner would have gross income of $45,600, coming 
in at the rate of $3,800 per month for the whole year. Her net income with interest at 
2.5% (reflecting 5% as reduced to take into consideration the monthly nature of the 
income) for 1999 would therefore be $31,315.80; to which I added the interest factor on 
the prior year net interest and added that amount of $518.15 to the total, for a balance of 
$47,300.90 through the end of 1999. 
7. For the years 2000 through 2005 I applied the same calculations. 
8. From May 10, 2005 I simply carried forward the calculation and the simple 
interest with no additional income considered to the end of February 2009. A summary 
of my calculations are as follows: 
9. 1998: 22,800 at 1.25%= 285 : 23,085.00 - 33% = 15,466.95 
1999: 45,600 at 2.50% = 1,140 : 46,740 - 33% = 31,315.80 
Plus 15,466.95 at 5% = 773.35 - 3 3 % = 518.15 
47,300.90 
2000: 45,600 at 2.50% = 1,140: 46,740-33%= 31,315.80 
Plus 47,556.10 at 5% = 2,377.80 - 33% = 1,593.13 
80,209.83 
2 
2001: 45,600 at 2.50%= 1,140: 46,740-33%= 31,315.80 
Plus 80,209.83 at 5% = 4,010.49 - 33% = 2,687.03 
114,212.66 
2002: 45,600 at2.5% = 1,140: 46,740-33%= 31,315.80 
Plus 114,212.66 at 5% = 5,710.63-33%= 3,826.12 
149,354.58 
2003: 45,600 at 2.5% =1,140: 46,740-33%= 31,315.80 
Plus 149,354.58 at 5% = 7,467.73 - 33%= 5,003.34 
185,673.72 
2004: 45,600 at 2.5% =1,140: 46,740-33%= 31,315.80 
Plus 185,673.72 at 5% = 9,283.69 - 33%= 6,220.08 
223,209.60 
2005: 16,340 at 4.15% = 678.11: 17,018.11-33%= 11,402.13 
Plus: 223,209.60 at 5% = 11,160.48 - 33%= 7,477.52 
242,089.25 
2006: 242,089.25 at 5%= 12,104.46-33%= 8,109.99 
250,199.24 
2007: 250,199.24 at 5%= 12,509.96-33%= 8,381.67 
258,580.91 
2008: 258,580.91 at 5%= 12,929.04-33%= 8,662.46 
267,243.37 
2009: 267,243.37 at .83% for 2 months= 
2,218.12-33%= 1,486.14 
End of February 2009: 268,729.51 
O 
10. Accordingly, the Petitioner is entitled to $268,729.51 in net income 
through February 2009. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT 
DATED this 7_ day of February, 2009. 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Larry Tatum, upon providing proper identification verifying his personage, being first 
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he has read the foregoing document and 
knows and understands the contents thereof and agrees to the same. Further, that he 
executed the same, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me th i s / f ^ ; day of February, 2009. 
y. 
QQttNAMcNAlfl 
382C South 610 Weal 
SattUtefClty, Utah 84119 
My Commission Expires 
November 14,2009 
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